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9Content of the thesis
The aim of this thesis is to examine the consistency proofs for arith-
metic by Gerhard Gentzen from diﬀerent angles. The ﬁrst chapter
is an introduction to how the problem of consistency proofs relates
to the foundational debate of the 20th century. This paper was pre-
sented at the Paris-Nancy PhilMath workshop in 2009 and part of this
paper has appeared in the Logica Yearbook 2009 [13]. The second
chapter examines the diﬀerent proofs from a more technical aspect.
The subject of the third chapter is the extension of logical systems
with mathematical rules, a method which will be used throughout
the thesis. The fourth chapter gives a consistency proof for an intu-
itionistic sequent calculus. The result is based on Takeuti's proof in
[31]. The proof includes a cut elimination theorem for the calculus
and a syntactical study of the purely arithmetical part of the system,
resulting in a consistency proof for purely arithmetical derivations
that do not contain compound formulas or the induction rule. This
chapter will appear in a Gentzen centenary volume. The ﬁfth chapter
consists of a consistency proof for Heyting arithmetic in natural de-
duction. The proof is based on a normalization proof by Howard and
assigns vectors to derivations, which are then interpreted as ordinals.
The proof appears in Math. Log. Quart. [14].
This thesis is based on a Licensiate thesis approved by the De-
partment of Mathematics and Statistics at the University of Helsinki
in 2010.

Chapter 1
Looking for consistency
1.1 The problem
In 1900 Hilbert presented a list of 23 open problems in diﬀerent ﬁelds
of mathematics. The second of these problems was to ﬁnd a con-
sistency proof for the arithmetic of real numbers, that is, analysis.
The statement of the problem included the task of presenting an ax-
iomatization, in which all axioms are independent. But according to
Hilbert the most important question was to prove that the axioms
are not contradictory, that is, that a deﬁnite number of logical steps
from the axioms cannot lead to contradictory results.
The methods employed in the sought proof should be ﬁnitistic,
and it is therefore not suﬃcient to prove the consistency in a stronger
theory. The ﬁnitistic methods used should not presuppose a com-
pleted inﬁnity, but instead rely on constructive methods that are
directly accessible even to the man on the street.
The axioms of primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA) are the deﬁn-
ing equations of primitive recursive functions and the system consists
of a propositional calculus with induction on quantiﬁer-free formulas.
PRA is a weaker theory than Peano arithmetic (PA) and it is gen-
erally included in, and often identiﬁed with, ﬁnitistic logic, because
unbounded quantiﬁcation over the domain of natural numbers is not
allowed.
Gödel's second incompleteness theorem implies that the methods
12 1. Looking for consistency
of PA or PRA are not suﬃcient for proving even the consistency of
PA. Therefore, there is no solution to Hilbert's problem if the methods
are restricted to PRA. The consequences of the result of Gödel cannot
be questioned with respect to Hilbert's second problem. It proves that
the problem is unsolvable and that Hilbert's programme cannot be
carried out in full, but a partial realization is possible.
1.2 From the problem to Hilbert's program-
me
Hilbert's programme was initiated as a consequence of the founda-
tional debate at the turn of the century. During the early 1900's
Hilbert developed his views on the foundations of mathematics and
presented his views in a succession of papers. He proposed a method
for solving the foundational crisis that had emerged after the para-
doxes of set theory. In 1921 the aims of Hilbert's programme consisted
of formalizing all mathematical theories, and providing `ﬁnitary' con-
sistency proofs for them. Furthermore, the programme included that
the questions of mutual independence and completeness of the axioms
of the theory were to be answered and possibly a decision method
found for the theory.
A narrow description of the programme requires ﬁnitary proofs
of the formal consistency of formal arithmetic. In broader terms the
program asserts that inﬁnitary notions should only be used as abbre-
viations. The aim of the programme is to give an understanding of
existing proofs from a ﬁnitistic view. Hilbert's opinions on inﬁnitistic
and in particular set theoretic notions in mathematics is that because
they are more or less abbreviations for other concepts, they should be
possible to eliminate from proofs. Although the programme does not
explicitly mention an elimination procedure, we believe that search-
ing for a procedure that eliminates all reference to inﬁnitistic concepts
is essential. Such a procedure should not solely consist of restricting
the methods of proof, but it should apply to all methods of proof.
Furthermore, the process of eliminating inﬁnitary concepts could be
regarded as a useful scientiﬁc tool, as the elimination at times could
1.3. Gentzen's work related to Hilbert's programme 13
increase our conviction in the theorem proved.1
Hilbert's main point in his second problem was that it should
be possible to make the ﬁniteness of all proofs explicit. This idea
developed into his programme. However, in his statement of the
problem he had left open the question of exactly which axioms were
to be considered and which modes of inference were to be proven free
from contradiction.
The consistency of a theory may be proven either semantically or
syntactically. A semantical proof consists of proving that the theory
is satisﬁable by a model. An alternative to Hilbert's programme is to
use inﬁnite models and establish not only consistency, but soundness
of the axioms for the intended meaning. This means too that the
inference rules prove only formulas that are valid with respect to the
system's semantics or that the rules `preserve truth'. A semantical
proof is by no means ﬁnite if it deals with inﬁnite domains. This
means that the consistency of arithmetic, as referred to in Hilbert's
programme, should be established without the use of inﬁnite mod-
els. A syntactical consistency proof, on the other hand, requires only
proof theoretical means, as it concerns provability. Completeness of
predicate calculus, however, implies that the semantical and syntac-
tical notions of consistency are equivalent. The diﬀerence in these
approaches is noticeable in the methods of proof which are accepted.
The proof theoretical approach is namely constructive.
1.3 Gentzen's work related to Hilbert's pro-
gramme
By Gödel's incompleteness theorem from 1931 it was shown that no
formalization of elementary arithmetic can be complete and that it
is impossible to ﬁnd a ﬁnite consistency proof for PA in the sense
that Hilbert's programme required. Therefore, the methods that are
proper to the theory, the consistency of which we are proving, do
not suﬃce when proving consistency of the theory. To produce a
consistency proof, the consistency of the methods used need to be
presupposed. That is, no absolute consistency proof exists and all
1Kreisel 1976 [16], p. 98.
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proofs merely reduce the question of consistency to that of the other
theory used.
Kreisel notes that even if the consistency of the theory ensures the
existence of some concept satisfying all the theorems of this system,
it does not ensure that the particular concept (of natural numbers)
for which axioms of arithmetic is intended, satisﬁes those theorems.2
The incompleteness theorem means that in any formal theory, there
are always true number-theoretical sentences that are not provable
within the theory. Another description of the result is that sen-
tences can always be found, the proofs of which again always require
new modes of inference. ([6, p.357]) This reveals a weakness in the
axiomatic method, implying that the consistency proofs must be ex-
tended whenever the proof means are extended. In 1937 Gentzen
however considers the extensions not relevant in practice, because at
that time no Gödel sentence of practical signiﬁcance had been re-
vealed, except for the sentence expressing consistency. In 1943 he
would himself accomplish such an extension, by proving that the
principle of transﬁnite induction up to 0 is independent of PA.
With broader methods it is still possible to produce a proof,
though the ﬁniteness of these methods is debated. Gödel's dialec-
tica interpretation as well as Gentzen's consistency proofs for PA can
be seen as a realization of Hilbert's programme, if it is extended to
include constructive methods.
1.4 Gentzen's proofs
The earliest proofs of the consistency of Peano arithmetic were pre-
sented by Gentzen, who worked out a total of four proofs that were
published between 1936 and 1974. Neither Bernays nor Gödel were
satisﬁed with Gentzen's ﬁrst consistency proof, which is shown in cor-
respondence from Gentzen to Bernays in the fall of 1935.3 The proof
was withdrawn from publication due to the criticism by Bernays for
implicit use of the fan theorem, although this assessment was later
retracted 4. However, a galley proof of the article was preserved and
2Kreisel 1976 [16], p. 97.
3von Plato 2007 [25], p. 392.
4Bernays 1970 [1].
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excerpts were published posthumously in English translation [9], as
well as unabridged in the German original [10].
König's lemma, which states that a ﬁnitely branching tree with
an inﬁnity of nodes has an inﬁnite branch, is not constructively valid.
The contrapositive of König's lemma, called the fan theorem, is how-
ever constructive. It states that if all branches of a tree are ﬁnite,
then the whole tree is also ﬁnite.
However, it has been noted by Kreisel in 1987 that this princi-
ple is not suﬃcient for proving the consistency of Peano arithmetic.
The principle that was implicitly used to prove termination is bar re-
cursion. Bar recursion is essentially recursion on well-founded trees,
it is the contrapositive of a similar classical principle for inﬁnitely
branching trees. Gentzen, who had already thought of the objections,
reworked his proof and instead relied on the principle of transﬁnite
induction. The result was the published second proof [5], which is
contains an ordinal assignment and a constructive proof of the prin-
ciple of transﬁnite induction up to the ordinal 0.
The third proof in sequent calculus was published in 1938. By
Gentzen's fourth proof from 1943, it is proven that the consistency
of PA can be proven relative to a theory if and only if the proof
theoretical ordinal is greater than 0.
1.5 The principle of transﬁnite induction
The principle of transﬁnite induction can be expressed in the follow-
ing way: Let P (β) be a property deﬁned for all ordinals β and let α
be an arbitrary ordinal. Then if we assume that for all β < α, P (β)
holds, and from this it follows that P (α) holds, then by the principle
the property holds for all ordinals.
Gentzen's use of the principle was restricted to primitive recursive
predicates. The primitive recursive predicates, P (n), can be veriﬁed
for an arbitrary number, n, by a bounded computation.
In his proof from 1943 he represented transﬁnite induction up to
0 as an arithmetical formula and showed that it is not provable in
Peano arithmetic, but that any weaker induction principle is provable.
In the proof the natural numbers are extended by what are called
constructive ordinals. The induction principle is also extended into
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a transﬁnite induction principle.
Schütte and Schwichtenberg [30] note that the transﬁnite induc-
tion certainly transcended the ﬁnite standpoint, as by Gödel is nec-
essary, but it proceeds in a completely constructive way, so that the
proof of Gentzen is seen as a testimonial for pure number theory in
the sense of the extended Hilbert Programme...
In general, a set-theoretical proof of the principle of transﬁnite in-
duction is not acceptable if the methods are to be considered reliable
from a constructive point of view. Instead Gentzen proves that each
ordinal up to 0 is accessible. Accessibility means that all descend-
ing chains of ordinals are ﬁnite, or that the ordinals are well-ordered.
This principle is used in order to prove termination in a ﬁnite number
of steps of the reduction procedure described in Gentzen's proof.
1.6 Crisis and paradoxes
The importance of consistency proofs was debated due to the founda-
tional crisis at the time when Gentzen published his proofs. Gentzen
points out that despite the eﬀorts to ﬁnd a solution for the para-
doxes of set theory, that is, to pinpoint the fallacy of the reasoning
that leads to antinomies, a clear solution should not be expected.
The ﬂaw in the reasoning cannot deﬁnitely be pointed at. Gentzen
however follows the proponents of intuitionism by claiming that the
antinomies of set theory have their origin in the liberal use of the
concept of inﬁnity. He claims that "we can only say deﬁnitely that
the materialisation of the antinomies is connected with the concept
of inﬁnity, because a purely ﬁnite mathematics, as far as anyone can
judge, no contradictions can arise, provided the mathematics is cor-
rectly constructed." ([6, p. 353])
One simple solution is to draw a clear line between permissible
and impermissible modes of inference, thereby blocking the undesired
inferences that lead to antinomies. This method has been employed,
for example, in axiomatic set theory, by restricting the comprehension
schema. However, according to Gentzen [6, p. 353] this solution gives
rather arbitrary restrictions if the source of the antinomies has not
been properly identiﬁed. Furthermore, new antinomies may in the
future prove to be derivable with the allowed inferences. Another
1.7. The intuitionistic method 17
solution to the paradox is the introduction of a type structure, which
is also noted by Gentzen.5
In Gentzen's opinion Russell's paradox reveals a fault in the logical
inferences involved. He opposes impredicative deﬁnitions and regards
only constructive deﬁnitions as valid. New sets should be deﬁned on
the basis of already formed sets, because it is illicit to deﬁne an
object by means of a totality and then to regard it as belonging
to that totality, so that it contributes to its own deﬁnition. The
deﬁnition of a set of all sets is circular, as this set is deﬁned and
then concluded to belong to itself.6 A problem that emerges from
invalidating impredicative reasoning is that this form of reasoning is
also used in analysis, in the proofs of basic theorems, such as the
intermediate value theorem. The deﬁnition of the intermediate point
is problematic, because the point is included in the intervals deﬁned
in the proof of the theorem. This means that the point is deﬁned by
referring to the totality of reals and is then concluded to belong to
this totality.
A radical standpoint is taken by the intuitionists who do not con-
sider the arguments used in classical analysis to be valid, because the
law of trichotomy is not true on the intuitionistic continuum. Thus,
they reject the means of proof that allows a division of the reals
into two intervals. The intuitionist standpoint is not only taken to
avoid possible antinomies, but because the classical statements are
considered meaningless.
1.7 The intuitionistic method
Hilbert's programme had not been abandoned by Gentzen. After
the ﬁnitistic methods had proven to be insuﬃcient for proving the
consistency of arithmetic, Gentzen continued the search for a proof.
Gentzen's work explores the consequences of the ﬁnitistic view of
formalist mathematics as stated by Hilbert. In order to prove consis-
tency Gentzen followed the general aims of Hilbert's program, which
were to prove consistency by means of inference that are completely
5Gentzen 1969 [9], p. 214.
6Gentzen 1969 [9], p. 134.
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unimpeachable (`ﬁnitist' forms of inference).7
In 1933 the Gödel-Gentzen negative translation showed that clas-
sical arithmetic can be reduced to intuitionistic arithmetic, implying
that the constructive methods go beyond ﬁnitistic reasoning. There-
fore, Hilbert's programme could be continued if it was modiﬁed to use
the broader constructive methods. In the light of this, the negative
translation was considered the ﬁrst consistency proof for arithmetic.8
Gentzen's aim was to prove the consistency of classical mathe-
matics, in the ﬁrst place arithmetic and then analysis, by extending
the methods to constructive or intuitionistically acceptable methods.9
The constructive method used as a foundation for the consistency
proofs is similar to, although somewhat broader than, Hilbert's ﬁni-
tistic standpoint. In Gentzen's opinion it provides a secure founda-
tion because it employs the concept of possible inﬁnity, not an actual
inﬁnity. The actual inﬁnity is identiﬁed as a doubtful element in the
methods of proof. The constructive concept of inﬁnity, on the other
hand, is not included in the framework of elementary number theory,
but is conjectured to be extensible beyond any formal theory.
These methods include a constructive interpretation of quantiﬁca-
tion over the inﬁnite domain of natural numbers. If the numbers are
substituted one by one in a formula that has been universally quan-
tiﬁed, then the result is a true formula. An existentially quantiﬁed
formula, on the other hand, means that a witness to the formula has
been found. Even so, Gentzen thinks that some methods encountered
in his proof give cause for concern from the ﬁnitistic standpoint, in
particular the principle of transﬁnite induction.10 Whether the proof
can be regarded as ﬁnitistic depends on if the principle of transﬁnite
induction can be accepted as a ﬁnitistic method.
1.8 How consistency proofs are possible
In a lecture from 1937 ([6, p. 355]) Gentzen characterized Hilbert's
programme as a way to reduce the metamathematical presupposi-
7Gentzen, 1969, [9], p.135.
8von Plato 2007 [25], p. 392.
9Gentzen 2007 [6], and von Plato 2007 [25], p. 383.
10Gentzen 1969 [9], p.136.
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tions and he followed Hilbert in this respect. In a letter from 1932
Gentzen states that through the formalisation of logical deduction,
the task of producing a consistency proof becomes a purely mathe-
matical problem.11 The purpose was to eliminate all philosophical
problems, or at least separate them from scientiﬁc practice. This
was at a time when he worked on extending the consistency proof for
arithmetic to include the rule of induction.
In his paper from 1936 Gentzen clearly states that the purpose
of the proof is to reduce the question of consistency of arithmetic to
certain general and fundamental principles. He concludes in [5] that a
consistency proof is still possible and meaningful if the methods used
are more reliable, even if not proper to elementary number theory.
It is possible to reduce some parts of arithmetic to other parts, e.g.
arithmetic of complex numbers to that of real numbers. But Gentzen
concludes that there remains the task of proving the consistency of
elementary number theory. His main concern is with the proving of
the consistency of the logical reasoning used when proving statements
about the natural numbers. This means that the consistency of the
system of axioms or the basic relations between numbers is not what
he is aiming to prove, because it is the reasoning employed that may
produce antinomies. Gentzen discusses to what extent it is possible to
carry out a consistency proof and claims that it is both necessary and
possible to produce a proof, due to the paradoxes that had emerged
in other areas of mathematics.
Kreisel, on the other hand, expresses doubt in the signiﬁcance of
consistency proofs. The question is whether the proofs have epis-
temological value. If ordinary mathematics is really so reliable [as
Hilbert emphasized] then the value of Hilbert's consistency program
cannot possibly consist in increasing signiﬁcantly the degree of re-
liability (of ordinary mathematics).12 It can be noted that Tarski
regarded Gentzen's proof as an interesting metamathematical result,
but he did not think that the proof made the consistency of arithmetic
more evident than by epsilon.13
According to Kreisel the analysis of the signiﬁcance of a consis-
11Menzler-Trott 2007 [19], p. 29.
12Kreisel 1971 [15], p. 240.
13Menzler-Trott 2007 [19], p. 81.
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tency proof can be more complicated than the proof itself. The point
that Kreisel makes is a criticism of Hilbert's programme; that consis-
tency proofs are sought as a reduction of complex concepts to simpler
ones. The elimination of problematic notions is contrary to our in-
tellectual experience. Our experience instead consists of eliminating
concepts in practice, not just in theory, or of giving independent
meaning to concepts and steps which, originally, occur as mere tech-
nical auxiliaries. 14
1.9 A partial solution
The argument against a relative consistency proof is that it provides
only a limited support for the consistency of arithmetic. In the case of
the negative translation it proves that an inconsistency cannot stem
from the principle of indirect proof. But Gentzen's proofs, however,
claim to be absolute in another sense. Their purpose is to provide
a secure foundation, taken into consideration the limitations that
Gödel's theorem impose. In particular, the additional principle of
transﬁnite induction used in Gentzen's proof makes the ﬁniteness of
the proof debatable. By Gentzen's proof it is established that it is
possible to prove consistency without relying on intuitionistic logic.
The reduction procedure of the proof can be represented in primitive
recursive arithmetic and transﬁnite induction up to the ordinal 0
restricted to primitive recursive predicates. The claimed ﬁniteness
of the principle relies on the fact that the predicates to which it is
applied are ﬁnite, that is, they do not contain quantiﬁcation over the
whole domain of natural numbers. But, as mentioned, Gentzen also
provides a constructive proof for the principle itself.
Thus, there are three methods that can be employed to ﬁnd con-
sistency proofs; ﬁnitism, Gentzen's approach and intuitionism. The
unsuccessful ﬁnitistic approach prohibits the use of negation over a
proposition that has been universally quantiﬁed over an inﬁnite do-
main.15 The intuitionistic approach, on the other hand bans the
law of excluded middle to inﬁnite sets, which is a weaker restriction.
Thirdly, the principle TI in Gentzen's approach extends inductive
14Kreisel 1971 [15], p. 252.
15Mehlberg 2002 [17], p. 74.
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reasoning to a transﬁnite domain. This principle is unprovable in
intuitionistic reasoning.
1.10 A partial solution from the empirical
sciences
According to Hilbert the metamathematics or the knowledge of how
problems are solved should solely be based on ﬁnitistic reasoning.
The reasoning is therefore more restricted than in proper mathe-
matics, in hope of accomplishing an intuitive line of thought. But
according to Mehlberg (2002) too strong restrictions on metamath-
ematics may limit our knowledge. He states that in particular, the
metamathematical problem of consistency may prove to transcend
the potentialities of human knowledge if the knowledge of a system's
consistency were expected to meet the unrealistic conditions which
were inherent in the initial phase of the formalist program. 16
Our knowledge may be dependable, even if it is not of the infallible
deductive kind and this kind of knowledge oﬀers a solution to the
consistency proof. In Mehlberg's opinion the consistency of a theory
can be dependable if serious and diverse, but unsuccessful, attempts
have been made to derive contradictions. The future possibility of a
proven contradiction points merely to the fact that the knowledge is
not infallible. By a reasonable degree of certainty, as in the empirical
sciences, this can be given the epithet knowledge, rather than belief.
With reference to a conversation with Gödel, Mehlberg states that
the quest for a set-theoretical foundation for mathematics in Gödel's
opinion was mainly for explanatory purpose, not in order to provide
a real foundation. The aim is to explain the phenomena, as is done
in physics, where phenomena are explained by the theory.
1.11 Following in Gentzen's path
The legacy of Gentzen's work in this ﬁeld is that through him ordinal
analysis became known. This is the method of measuring the proof-
theoretic strength of a formal system of mathematics, by the least
16Mehlberg 2002 [17], p.72.
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ordinal, α, with the property that no recursive well-ordering of ordinal
type α may be proven well-ordered in the system in question. That
the proof-theoretical ordinal of ﬁrst-order arithmetic is 0 was proven
by Gentzen in 1943.
After the Second World War some subsystems of classical anal-
ysis were proven to be consistent using the methods developed by
Gentzen. By restricting the application of the comprehension axiom
in second order predicate calculus, subsystems of classical analysis
are obtained. For some of these systems it is possible to produce
constructive consistency proofs.17
17Schütte and Schwichtenberg 1990 [30], p. 725.
Chapter 2
Consistency proofs in
diﬀerent calculi
2.1 Natural deduction and sequent calcu-
lus
In Gentzen's opinion the object of logic is to study the general struc-
tures of proofs. This opinion is a break with the logicist tradition of
Frege, Peano, Russell and Hilbert who considered the object of logic
to study logical truth.1
Gentzen developed the systems of natural deduction and sequent
calculus to analyze the structure of proofs. The former was successful
for the intuitionistic case and the latter was needed to deal with the
classical case. Natural deduction with its hypothetical reasoning was
developed to echo better than axiomatic calculi the actual reasoning
in mathematical proofs. It can be noted that the system of natural
deduction was independently developed by Jaskowski in 1934. His
system is presented in linear form and his work does not contain any
analysis of the structure of the derivations.2
Sequent calculus, on the other hand, proved to be the system in
which Gentzen found his main result, the Hauptsatz or cut elimina-
1von Plato 2007, [25], p. 384.
2Jaskowski 1967 [12].
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tion theorem. The system was developed to prove the Hauptsatz for
predicate logic. The result can be used to prove consistency for the
system of rules. The calculus formalizes the derivability of a formula
from other formulas, Γ→ C, represented by an arrow between a list
of assumptions, Γ, as an antecedent and a conclusion, C, as a succe-
dent of the sequent. As a generalization of the notion of sequent a
classical multi-succedent calculus is obtained. In the classical calcu-
lus the sequents, Γ→ ∆, can be interpreted as a number of cases, ∆,
under the open assumptions, Γ. It is not necessarily decidable which
of the cases hold.
In Gentzen's formalized systems intuitionistic logic gains a strong
position because it becomes a special case of the classical calculus.
This property may not be as striking in other calculi, in which the
rules are chosen diﬀerently. The calculi show his intent to use intu-
itionistic logic as a base for his argumentation.
2.2 From 1936 to 1938
The calculus used in Gentzen's ﬁrst two proofs is natural deduction
in sequent calculus style. The calculus has rules from natural deduc-
tion operating on sequents. Instead of left rules, operating on the
antecedent, there are elimination rules operating on the succedent.
In the latter proof from 1936 the number of rules is decreased.
Initial sequents are used in order to replace logical rules and dis-
junction, implication and the existential quantiﬁer are eliminated.
The new initial sequents replacing the logical rules are among others
A&B → A, A,B → A&B, ∀xA(x) → A(t) and ¬¬A → A. Gentzen
regarded structural rules as purely formal modiﬁcations of the se-
quents, except for the rule of weakening. These rules were added to
the calculus in order to obtain special features for the formalism.
The proof from 1936 can be explained as a `reduction procedure'
for sequents. Firstly, all free variables are replaced by numerals and
then choices are made as the sequent is reduced to less complex se-
quents. The choices made can be regarded as aiming for the worst
possible scenario, in which the sequent is falsiﬁed. The reduction ends
in a reduced form, which consists of a true sequent. A sequent is true
if the antecedent contains a false atomic formula or if the succedent
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is a true atomic formula. Gentzen shows that initial sequents are re-
ducible and that the rules preserve reducibility. Consistency follows
from the fact that the sequent → 0 = 1 is not in reduced form nor
reducible.
The proof also gives an ordinal assignment to prove that the pro-
cess terminates. This can be compared to the proof from 1938, which
also uses an ordinal assignment, but has a standard notation for the
ordinal numbers.
As a standard version of the classical consistency proof we con-
sider Takeuti's version [31], which is based on Gentzen's proof [7].
This third proof is the best known of Gentzen's papers on this sub-
ject. Gentzen's consistency proof from 1938 can be explained as con-
sisting of a well-ordering of all derivations and a reduction procedure
for derivations of the empty sequent. Derivations are ordered by com-
plexity and the reduction decreases the complexity of the derivation.
Therefore, if there exists a derivation of the empty sequent, then by
a ﬁnite number of steps a simple derivation, which does not contain
any induction rule, is reached. Consistency then follows by proving
that the empty sequent is not derivable without the induction rule.
In the article from 1938 a standard multi-succedent sequent cal-
culus is used. In contrast to the earlier proofs the reduction process
resembles cut elimination. In the ﬁrst step of the reduction proce-
dure free variables in a derivation of the empty sequent are replaced
by numerals. Then the `end-piece' of the derivation is considered.
The end-piece consists of structural rules and induction at the end
of the derivation. Induction rules and initial sequents are reduced if
they occur in the end-piece. Lastly, cuts on compound formulas are
reduced. The cuts are not directly reduced to cuts on less complex
formulas, but additional cuts on the less complex formulas are intro-
duced. This introduction of additional cuts is called the height-line
argument. The ordinal assignment deﬁnes a notion of height of a cut
and the additional cuts push up the places in the derivation where
the heights of the cuts drop. These drops aﬀect the ordinal assigned
and the result is a reduction of the ordinal of the derivation.
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2.3 Gentzen's consistency proof performed
in natural deduction
Since the publication of Gentzen's proof, the conducting of the consis-
tency proof in standard natural deduction has been an open problem.
This problem has recently been solved for an intuitionistic calculus
by the present author in chapter 5. The result is based on a nor-
malization proof by Howard [11], recommended to the author by Per
Martin-Löf. The new consistency proof is performed in the manner
of Gentzen, by giving a reduction procedure for derivations of falsity.
In contrast to Gentzen's proof, the procedure uses a vector assign-
ment. The reduction reduces the ﬁrst component of the vector and
this component can be interpreted as an ordinal less than 0, thus
ordering the derivations by complexity and proving termination of
the process.
The assignment uses vectors instead of a direct ordinal assignment
because the length of the vector is used as a parameter coding the
complexity of the formulas in the derivation. An interesting feature
of the proof is that the reduction of induction rules produces non-
normalities in the reduced derivation as it introduces an implication,
which is directly followed by an elimination of the same implica-
tion. This can be compared to Gentzen's proof from 1938, which
introduces additional cuts in the derivation. However, if Gentzen's
proof were translated into natural deduction, the reduced implica-
tion would become a composition of the premises of the induction
rule. Gentzen's procedure otherwise resembles cut elimination and
the natural deduction proof resembles a normalization proof as stan-
dard detour conversions are made after the induction inferences have
been reduced.
In the article Zusammenfassung von mehreren vollständigen In-
duktionen zu einer einzigen, which was published posthumously, Gen-
tzen shows a method of fusing several induction inferences in a deriva-
tion into one. A formula (y = 1 ⊃ A1(x))& . . .&(y = n ⊃ An(x)),
denoted B(x), is constructed, which contains the free variables x and
y and fuses the induction formulas Ai, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then from
the formula [B(0)&∀x(B(x) ⊃ B(x + 1))] ⊃ ∀xB(x), the induction
axiom for each separate formula may be derived, by substituting num-
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bers for the free variable y. A consequence of this result is that the
number of induction inferences cannot be used as a measure of the
derivation's complexity, it is the complexity of the induction formula
that counts.
2.4 Consistency without induction
When Gentzen began writing his thesis, Untersuchungen über das
logische Schliessen (1934) [9], he intended to provide a consistency
proof for arithmetic, by proving the Hauptsatz. However, it turned
out not to be possible to treat the rule of induction in this manner.
Therefore, a corollary occurring in the thesis is only a consistency
proof for the system without induction.
In the thesis Gentzen presents a formal axiomatic system for ele-
mentary arithmetic without induction. He concludes that it cannot
be proven that the system actually allows us to represent all types of
proofs customary in formal arithmetic. It can only be tested that in-
dividual proofs are representable. He then proves consistency for this
system. A contradiction is derivable if and only if there is a deriva-
tion in the logical calculus of a sequent with an empty succedent and
arithmetical axioms in the antecedent. The sharpened Hauptsatz is
then applied to the derivation and free variables are replaced with a
constant. Furthermore, by replacing eigenvariables in subdervations
it is concluded that if an inconsistency is derivable, then it is also
derivable from numerical propositions using only propositional logic.
And such a derivation is not possible, which Gentzen indicates by
referring to a soundness proof for the propositional calculus.
The sharpened Hauptsatz states that if each formula in a derived
sequent has quantiﬁers only as outermost connectives, then there is a
cut-free derivation, which has only quantiﬁer rules at the end of the
derivation. There is a midsequent in the derivation dividing it into
an upper part, containing only propositional logic and a lower part
containing only quantiﬁer rules.
The aim of the ﬁrst part of the chapter 4 is to provide a proof
analysis of a system of arithmetical rules. As a corollary of the main
lemmas together with cut elimination we get a consistency proof
for arithmetic without induction by using purely proof-theoretical
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means. A consistency proof for the full arithmetical system can be
obtained by a Gentzen-style proof, such as in [31, ch. 2, 12].
Lemma 4.4.11 proves that the empty sequent is not derivable with-
out the second inﬁnity rule, which states that the successor function
is injective. By a combinatorial argument it is then proven that the
second inﬁnity rule is admissible if the antecedent is empty.
Gentzen and Takeuti use semantical arguments to prove a lemma
(our lemma 4.4.20) stating that there is no so called simple deriva-
tion of the empty sequent. Their proof is short, but we shall instead
use methods which are coherent with the proof theoretical analysis
of Gentzen's consistency proof. It is shown that the lemma can be
proved purely proof-theoretically, by formulating the arithmetical ax-
ioms as rules instead of initial sequents and by considering all possible
combinations of these rules, as in lemma 4.4.14.
2.5 A direct proof in an intutionistic cal-
culus
A study of the papers Gentzen left behind shows that he worked
on yet another ﬁfth proof between 1939 and 1943. The aim was
to rework the 1938 proof with an intuitionistic sequent calculus, to
get a direct proof of the consistency of intuitionistic Heyting arith-
metic. Gentzen's attempts are preserved in the form of close to a
hundred large pages of stenographic notes, with the signum BTJZ
that stands for "Proof theory of intuitionistic number theory". For
further reading and description of Gentzen's manuscripts we recom-
mend the thorough discussion of Gentzen's work found in [27].
The aim of the second part of chapter 4 is to give a direct Gentzen-
style proof of the consistency of intuitionistic arithmetic or Heyting
arithmetic. It is based on Gentzen's classical proof from 1938 for-
mulated by G. Takeuti in [31, ch. 2, 12]. Takeuti's proof can be
considered the standard proof for the classical calculus. The proof is
carried out by giving a reduction procedure (as in our lemma 4.4.21)
for every derivation of the empty sequent that represents a contra-
diction in the system. By giving every sequent an ordinal it is shown
that the reduction procedure terminates.
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Another proof of the consistency of Heyting arithmetic is given by
B. Scarpellini in [29]. His proof is based on the reductions of the clas-
sical calculus. An intuitionistic derivation is reduced by the classical
reductions. This results in a classical derivation with multi-succedent
sequents. However, as the additional formulas in the succedent have
been introduced by weakening, they can be deleted from the deriva-
tion, making it an intuitionistic derivation.
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Chapter 3
Rules of proof extending
a logical calculus
3.1 Axioms as rules
There are four ways of extending sequent calculus by axioms of a
mathematical theory. When extending a logical system with for-
malized axioms for proof analysis, the standard methods lead to the
failure of main results, such as Gentzen's Hauptsatz. The ﬁrst way
is to add an axiom A in the form of a sequent ⇒ A. These sequents
can be leafs of a derivation. This way of adding axioms leads to the
failure of cut elimination. Gentzen (1938) added mathematical basic
sequents P1, . . . , Pm ⇒ Q1, . . . , Qn to the logical system. In this case
the cuts can be limited to cuts on these basic sequents. A third way
is to treat axioms as a context Γ and relativizing each theorem to
Γ thus proving results of the form Γ ⇒ C. In this case cut elimi-
nation applies. The fourth method, which will be examined below,
is to extend the logical system by mathematical rules. If a sequent
is derivable in one of these four systems, then it is derivable in the
other systems as well. Thus, the four systems are equivalent.
The treatment of mathematical rules is developed in [20] and [21].
The method consists of converting axioms into rules of proof extend-
ing the logical calculus. By the treatment of axioms as rules, the
32 3. Rules of proof extending a logical calculus
derivation of a compound formula can be transformed into a deriva-
tion, in which the mathematical rules are separated from the logical
part. A consequence is that there are logic-free derivations of atomic
formulas from atomic assumptions.
Negri and von Plato [21] give a formulation of mathematical rules
in a G3 system (both classical and intuitionistic), in which the struc-
tural rules (weakening, contraction and cut) are admissible and not
explicit rules. In [20] the method is extended to geometric theories1
which contain existential axioms.
If a set of axioms for a theory are (the universal closure of)
quantiﬁer-free formulas, then these axioms can be converted into rules
of proof for the construction of formal derivations. Any quantiﬁer-
free axiom is equivalent to a conjunction of disjunctions of atoms and
negations of atoms, ¬P1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Pm ∨Q1 ∨ · · · ∨Qn. A conjunction
of disjunctions of this kind is equivalent to a conjunction of implica-
tions of the form: P1& . . .&Pm ⊃ Q1 ∨ · · · ∨ Qn. This implication
can be transformed into a rule of sequent calculus in which the ac-
tive formulas of the rule are on the right side or the left side of the
sequent arrow. The right rule scheme, R-RS, that corresponds to the
implication is
Γ→ ∆, Q1, . . . , Qn, P1 . . . Γ→ ∆, Q1, . . . , Qn, Pm
Γ→ ∆, Q1, . . . , Qn R−RS
The right rule can be interpreted as: if each atomic formula P1, . . . , Pm
follows as a case under the assumptions Γ, then the cases under Γ
are Q1, . . . , Qn.
The left rule scheme, L-RS, that corresponds to the implication
is
Q1, P1, . . . , Pm,Γ→ ∆ . . . Qn, P1, . . . , Pm,Γ→ ∆
P1, . . . , Pm,Γ→ ∆ L−RS
The interpretation of the left rule is that if something follows from
each of the cases Q1, . . . , Qn, then it already follows from just assum-
ing P1, . . . , Pm.
The conversion of axioms into rules of proof can be extended
to geometric theories, which have existential quantiﬁers included in
1Geometric formula is a term from category theory.
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the axioms. The axioms of geometric theories belong to the set of
geometric implications. Examples of geometric theories are Robinson
arithmetic, the theory of nondegenerate ordered ﬁelds and the theory
of real closed ﬁelds.
3.1.1 Deﬁnition. A geometric formula contains no implication or
universal quantiﬁer. A geometric implication is a sentence of the form
∀x(A ⊃ B), where A and B are geometric formulas. Furthermore, a
geometric theory is axiomatized by geometric implications.
Any geometric implication can be reduced to a conjunction of
formulas of the form ∀x(P1& . . .&Pm ⊃ ∃y1M1∨· · ·∨∃ynMn), where
Pi is an atomic formula for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and Mj is a conjunction of
atomic formulas for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. In the implication the variable
yj does not appear in Pi. We will use a vector notation, P for a
multiset of formulas P1, . . . , Pm and Qj for Qj1 , . . . , Qjkj . Let Mj be
the conjunction Qj1& . . .&Qjkj where Qjl are atomic formulas. A
replacement in a vector, Qj(yj/xj) denotes the replacement in each
of the components, that is Qj1(yj/xj), . . . , Qjkj (yj/xj).
The left geometric rule scheme, L-GRS, that corresponds to the
geometric axiom is
Q1(y1/x1), P ,Γ→ ∆ . . . Qn(yn/xn), P ,Γ→ ∆
P ,Γ→ ∆
L−GRS
where the variables yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are the eigenvariables of the rule.
The eigenvariables must not occur in the conclusion of the rule, that
is in P ,Γ,∆.
The geometric axiom is equivalent to the geometric rule scheme,
because assuming admissibility of the structural rules, the axiom is
derivable from the geometric rule scheme and the scheme is derivable
if the geometric axiom is assumed.
The principal formulas of the rule (P1, . . . , Pm for the left rule and
Q1, . . . , Qn for the right rule) have to be repeated in the premises of
the rules in order to preserve admissibility of contraction when adding
mathematical rules to the logical system. When proving (height-
preserving) admissibility of contraction by induction on the length of
the derivation the repetition of the formula in the premises makes it
34 3. Rules of proof extending a logical calculus
possible to permute a contraction on Pi above the mathematical rule,
by duplicating the contraction for each premise.
It can be noted that a substitution of formulas in the rule scheme
can produce a duplicated principal formula, Pi. Therefore, to ensure
that contraction is admissible we also need to add a rule where the
formula is not duplicated. In other words, we have a closure condition
on the system of rules: If a given geometric theory includes a rule of
the form
Q1(y1/x1), P , P, P,Γ→ ∆ . . . Qn(yn/xn), P , P, P,Γ→ ∆
P , P, P,Γ→ ∆
then the system should also include the rule
Q1(y1/x1), P , P,Γ→ ∆ . . . Qn(yn/xn), P , P,Γ→ ∆
P , P,Γ→ ∆
The vector P is P1, . . . , Pm−2.
3.1.2 Example. In the theory of equality the rule of transitivity
a = c, a = b, b = c,Γ→ ∆
a = b, b = c,Γ→ ∆ Tr
has a limiting case if all terms are the same. In this case however the
rule given by the closure condition,
a = a, a = a,Γ→ ∆
a = a,Γ→ ∆
is a special case of the reﬂexivity rule,
a = a,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Ref
which is already included in the theory.
3.2 Natural deduction
A Harrop formula contains no hidden disjunctions, which implies that
if a disjunction is derivable from a set of Harrop formulas, then one
of the disjuncts is derivable.
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3.2.1 Deﬁnition. The class of Harrop formulas is deﬁned by
1. atomic formulas and ⊥ are Harrop formulas,
2. if A and B are Harrop formulas, then A&B is a Harrop formula,
3. if B is a Harrop formula, then A ⊃ B is a Harrop formula.
Any Harrop axiom is equivalent to a conjunction of implications
of the form: P1& . . .&Pm ⊃ Q for atomic Q and P1, . . . , Pm. Ax-
ioms that are Harrop-formulas may be converted into rules of nat-
ural deduction, because the calculus gives a single conclusion in a
natural-deduction-style rule. Therefore, the natural deduction rule
corresponding to the implication above is
P1 . . . Pm
Q
Rule
For axioms of a general form the system can be transformed into
a multi-conclusion natural deduction. Given an axiom of the general
form P1& . . .&Pm ⊃ Q1 ∨ · · · ∨Qn the corresponding rule of proof is
P1 . . . Pm
Q1 . . . Qn
MultiRule
The atomic formulas P1, . . . , Pm are the premises and the atomic
formulas Q1, . . . , Qn are the conclusions of the rule.
For geometric theories the axioms may be converted into rules
with eigenvariables resembling the rule for disjunction elimination:
....
P1 . . .
....
Pm
[Q1(y1/x1)]....
C · · ·
[Qn(yn/xn)]....
C
C
The conclusion of the rule, C, is an arbitrary formula and the sets of
atomic formulas Qj , containing the eigenvariables yj , are discharged.
The eigenvariables must not occur free in the open assumptions (ex-
cluding the discharged assumptions), or the conclusion of the rule.
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3.3 The subterm property
One feature of mathematical rules is that the active and principal
formulas are atomic formulas. If a logical rule occurs above the math-
ematical rule in a derivation, then the two rules may be permuted.
This holds because the active formula of the mathematical rule is not
the principal formula of the logical rule, but it is in the context of the
conclusion of the logical rule. Thus, there is a derivation in which
the all mathematical rules are above the logical rules. As a result
of Gentzen's cut elimination in sequent calculus or normalization in
natural deduction it is not necessary to consider the logical rules at
all if both the assumptions and the conclusion are atomic formulas.
Therefore, it is possible to separate the mathematical and the logical
part of a derivation.
Because the logical system for sequent calculus, described above,
is of type G3 with the structural rules admissible, we may do a root-
ﬁrst proof search. By this search the derivability of a sequent reduces
to the derivability of the leafs with mathematical rules.
If a subterm property is proven for a theory, then the terms oc-
curring in the derivation may be restricted to known terms from the
assumptions or the conclusion of the derivation. If this is the case
and our assumptions are a ﬁnite set of atomic formulas, then the pos-
sible combinations of terms in atomic formulas can be restricted to a
ﬁnite number. By combining these formulas we get a ﬁnite number
of possible derivations and it may be checked if any of these deriva-
tions are valid. Therefore, if the subterm property holds, we have
a positive solution to the so-called uniform word problem, claiming
that the derivability of an atomic formula from a number of atomic
formulas is decidable. Thus, it is decidable if a leaf is derivable with
mathematical rules.
3.4 Applications of the axioms-as-rules method
The method of axioms-as-rules has been applied to predicate logic
with equality, theories of apartness and order, projective and plane
aﬃne geometry [28], as well as lattice theory, ordered ﬁelds and real
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closed ﬁelds.2
The subterm property for lattices was established in [22] by an
analysis of the formal derivations of a natural deduction system ex-
tended by rules for lattice theory. The result has also been extended
to minimal quantum logic or orthologic, which is the study of ortho-
lattices. Meninander [18] presents a positive solution to the uniform
word problem for ortholattices. By analysis of the structure of pos-
sible derivations it is shown that proof search is bounded and thus
that the uniform word problem is solvable.
A consequence of a positive solution to the uniform word problem
for a ﬁnite Harrop axiom system is the existence of a polynomial-time
decision algorithm for the derivability of an atomic formula from a
ﬁnite number of atomic assumptions. There is only a linear number
of known subterms of the assumptions and the conclusion. Then the
derivation rules are applied to derive new atomic formulas with these
subterms until no new atomic formulas are derivable. This process is
a polynomial time decision algorithm for the uniform word problem.
The proof of this is analogous to the proof of a polynomial-time al-
gorithm for lattices by Skolem from 1920, which was rediscovered by
Cosmadakis [3]3.
Another example of a system extended with rules is found in [24],
in which a system of rules in natural deduction for Heyting arith-
metic is presented. The logical part of the system includes general
elimination rules, which are of the same form as the standard dis-
junction elimination rule. The induction rule is similarly formulated
which makes possible the permutative conversions. A normalization
theorem is then proven for Heyting arithmetic and as a consequence
the existence property is proven.
3.5 Independence of Euclid's parallel pos-
tulate
Von Plato [28] applies the method of axioms-as-rules to projective
and aﬃne plane geometry proving that the rules with eigenvariables
2Negri 2003 [20]
3Burris 1995 [2] and von Plato 2007 [26].
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are conservative over the base theory. The method employed consists
of proving the subterm property, concluding that the geometrical
objects of a derivation may be restricted to terms known from the
assumptions or from the conclusion of the theorem. The lowermost
occurrences of a new term in a derivation are considered and by per-
muting rules a standard form of derivation is obtained to which a
combinatorial analysis can be applied. By combinatorial analysis of
the possible rules the derivation is transformed to a shorter deriva-
tion. Thereby, using induction on the length of the derivation the
subterm property is proved.
As a consequence of the subterm property consistency proofs for
the two geometric theories are obtained, because the empty sequent
is not derivable. The stronger statement that any set of atomic for-
mulas is consistent also follows due to the fact that no sequent Γ→,
with Γ a set of atomic formulas, can be derived in a system of mathe-
matical right rules. The main corollary however is the independence
of Euclid's parallel axiom for aﬃne geometry. The parallel postulate
states that given a point, a, outside a line, l, there is no point incident
with both the line l and the parallel line through the point a. This can
be formalized as ¬(a ∈ l) ⊃ ¬(b ∈ l&b ∈ par(l, a)) and expressed as
a sequent without logical connectives as b ∈ l, b ∈ par(l, a)→ a ∈ l.4
The rule corresponding to the axiom included in the system of rules
is the rule for uniqueness of parallel lines.
a ∈ l a ∈ m l ‖ m
l = m
Unipar
If we assume b ∈ l and b ∈ par(l, a), as well as the additional assump-
tion l ‖ par(l, a), then by application of the rule we get the conclusion
l = par(l, a). By line substitution and the aﬃne axiom of incidence,
a ∈ par(l, a), we get the sought conclusion a ∈ l.
The proof of the independence of the parallel postulate comes
from the fact that restriction to known terms from the sequent b ∈
l, b ∈ par(l, a)→ a ∈ l can only produce a few new atomic formulas,
but not the sought formula a ∈ l. None of the rules, excluding the rule
of the uniqueness of the parallel line, can be applied to the premises
b ∈ l and b ∈ par(l, a). Using the available rules of the system we can
4The construction par(l, a) is the parallel line to l through the point a.
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only produce the new atomic formulas a ∈ par(l, a), par(l, a) ‖ l and
l ‖ par(l, a). After that nothing but loops are produced. Therefore,
there cannot be a derivation of the parallel axiom if the corresponding
rule of the uniqueness of the parallel line is left out.
Thus, it is possible to prove the independence of Euclid's parallel
postulate using proof theoretical means as opposed to the standard
method of referring to non-Euclidean geometries.
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Chapter 4
A direct Gentzen-style
consistency proof for
Heyting arithmetic
The aim of this chapter is to give a direct Gentzen-style proof of
the consistency of intuitionistic arithmetic. The proof is based on
Takeuti's proof [31, ch. 2, 12]. The ﬁrst part of the chapter removes
semantical arguments from the proof, by giving a purely proof theo-
retical analysis of the calculus without induction. A direct proof of
cut elimination is included in the analysis of the system. Finally, the
consistency proof for the complete system is given in Gentzen-style.
The proof is direct, instead of concluding that consistency of the in-
tuitionistic calculus follows from consistency of the classical calculus,
as the former is a subsystem of the latter. We shall assume that the
reader has basic knowledge of ordinals and refer to [31] for a more
detailed treatment of the subject.
4.1 The sequent calculus G0i
A sequent is an expression of the form Γ → A or Γ →, where the
antecedent Γ is a (possibly empty) multiset. A multiset is a ﬁnite list
of formulas where the order of the formulas does not matter but the
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multiplicity of the formulas does, in contrast to ordinary sets. In the
succedent A is a formula, but the succedent can also be empty. The
rules for the intuitionistic sequent calculus G0i, from [23] except that
we have no rule of weakening, are as follows.
Initial sequent:
A,Γ→ A
Logical rules:
A,B,Γ→ C
A&B,Γ→ C L&
Γ→ A Γ′ → B
Γ,Γ′ → A&B R&
A,Γ→ C B,Γ′ → C
A ∨B,Γ,Γ′ → C L∨
Γ→ A
Γ→ A ∨B R∨
Γ→ B
Γ→ A ∨B R∨
Γ→ A
∼A,Γ→ L∼
A,Γ→
Γ→∼A R∼
Γ→ A B,Γ′ → C
A ⊃ B,Γ,Γ′ → C L⊃
A,Γ→ B
Γ→ A ⊃ B R⊃
A(t/x),Γ→ C
∀xA,Γ→ C L∀
Γ→ A(y/x)
Γ→ ∀xA R∀
A(y/x),Γ→ C
∃xA,Γ→ C L∃
Γ→ A(t/x)
Γ→ ∃xA R∃
Structural rules:
A,A,Γ→ C
A,Γ→ C LC
Γ→ A A,Γ′ → C
Γ,Γ′ → C Cut
In the quantiﬁer rules the expression A(t/x) means that every free
occurrence of x in A is substituted with the term t. In the rules L∃
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and R∀ the standard variable restriction holds that y, also called the
eigenvariable of the rule, must not be free in the conclusion of the
rule. The formula that is introduced in the conclusion of a logical rule,
for example A&B in the conjunction rules, is the principal formula
of the rule. The formulas that the rule is applied on are the active
formulas. In the structural rules the principal formula is the formula
that the rules are applied on, in this case A. The formula is also called
contraction or cut formula. The multiset Γ in the sequents is called
the context of the rule. We use a calculus with arbitrary contexts in
all initial sequents and hence no rule of weakening is needed. We will
use the notation Γ1−2 as short for Γ1,Γ2.
4.2 Heyting arithmetic
The language of Heyting arithmetic consists of the constant 0, the
unary functional symbol s, the binary functional symbols + and ·
and the binary predicate symbol =.
4.2.1 Deﬁnition. Terms are inductively deﬁned. The constant 0
and variables are terms and if t and t′ are terms then s(t), t+ t′ and
t · t′ are also terms. Terms are closed if they do not contain any
variable.
Formal expressions for the natural numbers, numerals, are induc-
tively deﬁned: 0 is a numeral and if m is a numeral, then s(m) is also
a numeral. The numeral m is m copies of s followed by a 0.
The axioms of Heyting arithmetic can be formulated as rules of
natural deduction, expanding the logical calculus. Together with an
induction rule the logical and arithmetical rules constitute the system
of Heyting arithmetic (HA). Negri and von Plato [21] developed the
general method for converting mathematical axioms into rules for
the primary purpose of proving cut elimination in systems of sequent
calculus. The speciﬁc system for arithmetic was ﬁrst used by von
Plato [24] to prove the disjunction and existential properties. These
rules act on the succedent part of the sequents and have arbitrary
contexts. As a special case we get rules without premises.
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Rules for the equality relation:
Γ→ t = t Ref
Γ→ t = t′
Γ→ t′ = t Sym
Γ1 → t = t′ Γ2 → t′ = t′′
Γ1−2 → t = t′′ Tr
Recursion rules:
Γ→ t+ 0 = t +Rec0 Γ→ t+ s(t′) = s(t+ t′) +Recs
Γ→ t · 0 = 0 ·Rec0 Γ→ t · s(t′) = t · t′ + t ·Recs
Replacement rules:
Γ→ t = t′
Γ→ s(t) = s(t′) sRep
Γ→ t = t′
Γ→ t+ t′′ = t′ + t′′ +Rep1
Γ→ t′ = t′′
Γ→ t+ t′ = t+ t′′ +Rep2
Γ→ t = t′
Γ→ t · t′′ = t′ · t′′ ·Rep1
Γ→ t′ = t′′
Γ→ t · t′ = t · t′′ ·Rep2
Inﬁnity rules:
Γ→ s(t) = 0
Γ→ Inf1
Γ→ s(t) = s(t′)
Γ→ t = t′ Inf2
Induction rule:
Γ1 → A(0/x) A(y/x),Γ2 → A(sy/x) A(t/x),Γ3 → D
Γ1−3 → D Ind
In the arithmetical rules t, t′ and t′′ are terms. In the induction rule
y is the eigenvariable of the rule and it should not occur free in the
conclusion. The induction formula A is arbitrary.
4.3. The ordinal of a derivation 45
4.2.2 Deﬁnition. A valid derivation in HA is deﬁned inductively.
An initial sequent or an arithmetical rule without premises is a valid
derivation and a valid derivation is obtained by applying a rule on
valid derivations of the premises of the rule.
The end-piece of a derivation is deﬁned in the following way: the
end-sequent belongs to the end-piece. Furthermore, if the conclu-
sion of a structural rule or Ind is included in the end-piece, then the
premises of the rule are also included in the end-piece. An arithmeti-
cal or logical rule borders on the end-piece if the conclusion of the
rule is included in the end-piece.
A formula A is a descendant of a formula B if A is in the context
of the conclusion of a rule and B is an identical formula in the context
of a premise or if A is the principal formula of the rule and B is an
active formula in a premise. Furthermore, if A a descendant of B
and B is a descendant of C, then A is a descendant of C. If A is a
descendant of B, then B is a predecessor of A.
4.3 The ordinal of a derivation
We deﬁne the height of a sequent in a derivation.
4.3.1 Deﬁnition. (i) The grade of a formula is the number of
logical symbols in the formula. The grade of a Cut or an Ind
is the grade of the cut or the induction formula.
(ii) The height of a sequent S in a derivation P , denoted h(S;P ) or
h(S), is the maximum of the grades of the cuts and inductions
below S in P .
Note that the height of the end-sequent is 0 and that the premises
of a rule all have the same height. If S1 is a sequent under another
sequent S2, then h(S1) 6 h(S2).
To be able to calculate with ordinals we need to deﬁne a suitable
sum operation.
4.3.2 Deﬁnition. If two ordinals µ and ν are expressed in normal
form µ = ωµ1 + ωµ2 + · · · + ωµm and ν = ων1 + ων2 + · · · + ωνn ,
where µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µm and ν1 > ν2 > · · · > νn, then the
natural sum, denoted µ#ν, is equal to ωλ1 +ωλ2 + · · ·+ωλm+n , where
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{λ1, λ2, . . . , λm+n} = {µ1, µ2, . . . , ν1, ν2, . . . } are equal multisets and
λ1 > · · · > λn+m.
We shall also use the following notation: for an ordinal α and
a natural number n, ωn(α) is inductively deﬁned as ω0(α) ≡ α and
ωn+1(α) ≡ ωωn(α). Thus, we have
ωn(α) ≡ ω··
·ωα
}
n times ω.
The limit of ωn(0) when n approaches inﬁnity is 0, an ordinal which
in some ways characterizes the strength of derivability of arithmetic.
We can conclude that the following property holds for the ordinal 0.
4.3.3 Deﬁnition. An ordinal α is accessible if it has been shown
that every decreasing sequence beginning with α is ﬁnite.
4.3.4 Lemma. 0 is accessible.
Takeuti [31] proves the lemma by deﬁning eliminators, which are
operations on concretely given decreasing sequences of ordinal num-
bers. An argument with the standard well-ordering is also given to
convince the reader that it is indeed a well-ordering. The notion
of accessibility is only considered when it has been constructively
demonstrated that a sequence is ﬁnite. The aim of the proof is to
avoid abstract notions, except for concepts which are reduced to con-
crete operations. This, makes the proof an extension of the ﬁnitistic
standpoint of Hilbert.
We can now give every derivation in HA an ordinal.
4.3.5 Deﬁnition. The ordinal of a sequent S in a derivation P ,
denoted o(S;P ) or o(S), is deﬁned inductively as follows:
1. An initial sequent has the ordinal 1.
2. The conclusion of an arithmetical rule without premises has the
ordinal 1.
3. If S is the conclusion of a contraction then the ordinal is the
same as the ordinal of the premise.
4. If S is the conclusion of a one-premise arithmetical or logical
rule, where the ordinal of the premise is µ, then o(S) = µ+ 1.
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5. If S is the conclusion of a two-premise arithmetical or logical
rule, where the ordinals of the premises are µ and ν respectively,
then o(S) = µ#ν.
6. If S is the conclusion of a cut where the premises have the
ordinals µ and ν, then o(S) = ωk−l(µ#ν), or
ω·
··ω
µ#ν
}
k − l times ω,
where k is the height of the premises and l is the height of the
conclusion.
7. If S is the conclusion of an induction and the premises have
the ordinals µ1, µ2 and µ3 and the height k and the conclusion
has the height l, then the ordinal of the conclusion is o(S) =
ωk−l+1(µ1#µ2#µ3).
The ordinal of a derivation P , denoted o(P ), is the ordinal of the
end-sequent. Thus, every derivation has an ordinal less than 0.
If the height remains unchanged in a cut the ordinal of the con-
clusion in point 6 is µ#ν, whereas the ordinal of the corresponding
case in point 7 is ωµ1#µ2#µ3 .
4.4 The consistency of Heyting arithmetic
4.4.1 The consistency theorem
4.4.1 Deﬁnition. A system is said to be inconsistent if the empty
sequent → is derivable. If the system is not inconsistent it is consis-
tent.
4.4.2 Theorem (The consistency of Heyting arithmetic). The empty
sequent → is not derivable in HA, that is, HA is consistent.
To prove this theorem we give a reduction procedure for deriva-
tions. Assume that there is a derivation of the empty sequent. Fur-
thermore, we may assume that the arithmetical rules are applied
before logical and structural rules in the derivation. If needed, it is
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possible to change the order of the rules according to lemma 4.4.5,
even though this may increase the ordinal of the derivation. The
permutation only has to be performed once before the reduction pro-
cedure. By the reduction procedure we conclude that if there is a
derivation of the empty sequent, then there is a reduced derivation
with a lower ordinal and another reduced derivation and so on. Then
we would have an inﬁnite succession of decreasing ordinals all less
than 0, but this is impossible and the reduction procedure must
terminate. This is a contradiction and we therefore cannot have a
derivation of the empty sequent. Thus, the system of Heyting arith-
metic, HA, is consistent.
The reduction procedure for derivations is described in lemma
4.4.21, but before we give the proof we need some additional results.
4.4.2 Properties of derivations
4.4.3 Deﬁnition. A thread in a derivation is a sequence of sequents
in a derivation, for which the following holds:
1. It begins with an initial sequent or the conclusion of an arith-
metical rule without premises.
2. Every sequent but the last one is a premise of a rule and the
sequent is followed by the conclusion of that rule.
4.4.4 Lemma. Assume that S1 is a sequent in a derivation P . Let P1
be the subderivation ending with S1 and let P
′
1 be another derivation
ending with S1. Now let P
′ be the derivation that results from the
process of substituting P ′1 for P1 in P .
If o(S1;P
′) < o(S1;P ), then o(P ′) < o(P ).
Proof. For every thread in P passing through S1 we show that the
following holds: If S is a sequent in a thread at or below S1 and if
S′ is the corresponding sequent to S in P ′, then o(S′;P ′) < o(S;P ).
According to the assumption the proposition holds if S = S1. The
heights of the sequents below S in P and S′ in P ′ are the same and
for every ordinal α, β and γ that satisfy α < β, we have α#γ < β#γ.
Thus, the inequality is retained for every rule applied. If we then let
S be the end-sequent of the derivation we obtain the inequality for
the derivations.
4.4. The consistency of Heyting arithmetic 49
4.4.5 Lemma. In a derivation we can permute the order of the rules
and ﬁrst apply the arithmetical rules and then Ind and the logical and
structural rules.
Proof. If we have a logical rule followed by an arithmetical rule, then
the arithmetical rule is not applied on the principal formula of the
logical rule, since this formula is compound. Hence, we can permute
the order of the rules and apply the arithmetical rule ﬁrst.
Assume that we have an instance of contraction followed by an
arithmetical rule. If the arithmetical rule is not applied on the con-
traction formula, then we can permute the order of the rules. We now
consider the case that the arithmetical rule is applied on the contrac-
tion formula. If the arithmetical rule is a one-premise rule, then we
can apply the arithmetical rule on each copy of the formula followed
by an instance of contraction. If on the other hand the arithmetical
rule has two premises, that is, if the rule is an instance of transitivity,
then we can apply transitivity on each copy of the formula, multiply-
ing the derivation of the other transitivity premise, and then apply
contraction on the principal formula of the transitivity and also on
possible formulas in the context of the multiplied premise.
If we have an instance of Cut followed by an arithmetical rule,
then we can permute the order of the rules and the same holds for
an instance of Ind followed by an arithmetical rule.
Note that this change in the order of the rules can increase the
ordinal of the derivation.
4.4.6 Lemma. (i) For an arbitrary closed term t there exists a
numeral n such that → t = n can be derived without Ind or
Cut.
(ii) Let t and t′ be closed terms for which → t = t′ can be derived
without Ind or Cut and let q be an arbitrary term. Now the
sequent → q(t/x) = q(t′/x) is derivable without Ind or Cut.
(iii) Let t and t′ be closed terms for which → t = t′ can be derived
without Ind or Cut and let q and r be terms. Then the sequent
q(t/x) = r(t/x)→ q(t′/x) = r(t′/x) can be derived without Ind
or Cut.
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(iv) Let t and t′ be closed terms for which → t = t′ can be de-
rived without Ind or Cut. Then for an arbitrary formula A the
sequent A(t/x)→ A(t′/x) can be derived without Ind or Cut.
Proof. (i) For the constant 0 the proposition holds. Assume that
the proposition holds for the closed terms t and t′, that is there
are n and m, such that → t = n and → t′ = m can be de-
rived without Ind or Cut. Then the sequent → s(t) = s(n) is
derivable with sRep where s(n) ≡ n+ 1.
The sequent → t+ t′ = n+m can be derived as follows. First
we get a derivation of → t+ t′ = n+m.
→ t = n
→ t+ t′ = n+ t′ +Rep1
→ t′ = m
→ n+ t′ = n+m +Rep2
→ t+ t′ = n+m Tr
Furthermore, if m = 0 we have → n + 0 = n+ 0 with +Rec0
since n+ 0 ≡ n. Ifm > 0, that ism = sm′ for somem′, then we
have as induction hypothesis a derivation of→ n+m′ = n+m′.
→ n + sm′ = s(n + m′)
+Recs
→ n + m′ = n + m′
→ s(n + m′) = s(n + m′)
sRep
→ n + sm′ = s(n + m′) Tr
We now have → n+m = n+m for every m. With transitivity
on the conclusions of these derivations we get the result →
t+ t′ = n+m.
The sequent → t · t′ = n ·m is derivable in a similar manner.
(ii) If q is the constant 0 or a variable diﬀerent from x, then the
sequent is derivable with Ref . If q is the variable x, then we
already have the derivation according to the assumption. Now
assume that q ≡ s(q′) and as induction hypothesis we have a
derivation of→ q′(t/x) = q′(t′/x) that fulﬁlls the requirements.
Then we get→ s(q′(t/x)) = s(q′(t′/x)) with sRep. If q ≡ q′+q′′
we get the following derivation where we write q′(t) and q′′(t)
instead of q′(t/x) and q′′(t/x) and the sequent arrow is left out.
q′(t) = q′(t′)
q′(t) + q′′(t) = q′(t′) + q′′(t)
+Rep1
q′′(t) = q′′(t′)
q′(t′) + q′′(t) = q′(t′) + q′′(t′)
+Rep2
q′(t) + q′′(t) = q′(t′) + q′′(t′)
Tr
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If q ≡ q′ · q′′ the derivation is similar.
(iii) According to point (ii) we have derivations of → q(t) = q(t′)
and → r(t) = r(t′) that fulﬁll the requirements. We can now
construct the derivation:
→ q(t) = q(t′)
→ q(t′) = q(t) Sym q(t) = r(t)→ q(t) = r(t)
q(t) = r(t)→ q(t′) = r(t) Tr → r(t) = r(t′)
q(t) = r(t)→ q(t′) = r(t′) Tr
(iv) The proof is carried out by induction on the complexity of the
formula. If A is an atomic formula, then the proposition is
proved in case (iii).
IfA ≡ B&C and we as induction hypothesis have thatB(t/x)→
B(t′/x) and C(t/x) → C(t′/x) are derivable without Ind or
Cut, then we get the derivation:
B(t/x)→ B(t′/x) C(t/x)→ C(t′/x)
B(t/x), C(t/x)→ B(t′/x)&C(t′/x) R&
B(t/x)&C(t/x)→ B(t′/x)&C(t′/x) L&
Assume that A ≡ ∀yB. If x ≡ y then x is not free in A and
A(t/x) → A(t′/x) is an initial sequent. On the other hand
if x is not y, then we have by the induction hypothesis that
(B(z/y))(t/x) → (B(z/y))(t′/x), where x 6= z, can be derived
without Ind or Cut. Because t and t′ are closed terms, they do
not contain y and we may change the order of the substitutions,
that is (B(z/y))(t/x) = (B(t/x))(z/y) and (B(z/y))(t′/x) =
(B(t′/x))(z/y). We now get the derivation:
(B(t/x))(z/y)→ (B(t′/x))(z/y)
∀yB(t/x)→ (B(t′/x))(z/y) L∀
∀yB(t/x)→ ∀yB(t′/x) R∀
The other cases are similar.
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In point (i) of the lemma, we only state the existence of a numeral
that equals the closed term, not that this numeral is unique. The
uniqueness of the numeral is equivalent to the consistency of simple
derivations proved in lemma 4.4.20.
4.4.3 Cut elimination in Heyting arithmetic
We shall give a direct proof of cut elimination in the system HA.
Note that the Cut rule is a special case of our induction rule, if
the induction formula has no occurrence of the variable x. In this
case the second premise of the induction is an initial sequent and we
have a form of vacuous induction. Thus, cuts can be eliminated by
replacing them with inductions. But as the cut elimination theorem
4.4.8 shows, we can also properly eliminate Cut.
4.4.7 Deﬁnition. The length of a derivation in HA is deﬁned induc-
tively.
An initial sequent has the length 1.
The length of the conclusion of an arithmetical rule without premises
is 1.
The length of the conclusion of the rule Sym is the same as the length
of the premise.
The length of the conclusion of a one-premise rule (except Sym),
where the premise has the length α is α+ 1.
The length of the conclusion of a two-premise rule, where the premises
have the lengths α and β is α+ β.
The length of the conclusion of Ind, where the premises have the
lengths α, β and γ is α+ β + γ.
4.4.8 Theorem (Cut elimination in HA). If there is a derivation of
the sequent Γ→ D in HA, then we can transform the derivation into
a derivation of the same sequent without Cut or additional inductions.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the grade of the cut formula with
a subinduction on the length of the derivation. We assume that there
are no instances of Cut above the cut we consider.
We assume that the right cut premise has been derived with n−1
instances of contraction on the cut formula, where n > 1. We consider
the premise of the ﬁrst contraction.
4.4. The consistency of Heyting arithmetic 53
1. Firstly, we consider the case that the premise is an initial
sequent.
Γ1 → A
An,Γ2 → A
A,Γ2 → A LC
n−1
Γ1−2 → A Cut
In this case we can add the missing context Γ2 in the derivation of
the left cut premise and get the sought derivation without Cut.
We now assume that the premise of the contraction has been
derived by a rule R.
Γ1 → A
An,Γ2 → D R
A,Γ2 → D LC
n−1
Γ1−2 → D Cut
If rule R is an instance of Sym we can permute the contractions and
the cut above the Sym. The length of the cut remains unchanged.
Thus, we may assume that R is not Sym.
2. If rule R is an arithmetical rule without premises, then also
the conclusion of the cut is an instance of the same rule.
3. If rule R is an arithmetical one-premise rule, then A is not
principal in the rule. We can then permute the contractions and the
cut above the arithmetical rule, diminishing the length of the cut.
4. Suppose rule R is Tr.
Γ1 → A
Ak,Γ′1 → t = t′ Al,Γ′2 → t′ = t′′
An,Γ2 → t = t′′ Tr
A,Γ2 → t = t′′ LC
n−1
Γ1−2 → t = t′′ Cut
where Γ2 = Γ
′
1−2 and n = k + l. We then transform the derivation
diminishing the length of the cuts on A.
Γ1 → A
Ak,Γ′1 → t = t′
A,Γ′1 → t = t′ LC
k−1
Γ1,Γ
′
1 → t = t′
Cut
Γ1 → A
Al,Γ′2 → t′ = t′′
A,Γ′2 → t′ = t′′ LC
l−1
Γ1,Γ
′
2 → t′ = t′′
Cut
Γ21,Γ2 → t = t′′
Tr
.
.
.
.
contractions
Γ1−2 → t = t′′
54 4. A direct Gentzen-style consistency proof in HA
5. If rule R is a logical one-premise rule where A is not principal,
then we can permute the contractions and the cut above the rule,
diminishing the length of the cut.
6. If rule R is a logical two-premise rule where A is not principal,
then we transform the derivation as in case 4, diminishing the length
of the cuts.
7. Suppose rule R is a logical rule where A is principal. We
consider the rule with which the left premise of the cut has been
derived.
7.1 If the left cut premise is an initial sequent, then the formula
A is in Γ1. Thus, we can get the conclusion of the cut by adding
the missing context Γ1 without A in the derivation of the right cut
premise.
7.2 The left cut premise has not been derived by an arithmetical
rule, since the formula A has logical structure.
7.3 If the left cut premise has been derived by a logical one-
premise rule where A is not principal, then we can permute the cut
above the rule.
7.4 If the left cut premise has been derived by a logical two-
premise rule where A is not principal, that is L ⊃ or L∨, then we
can in the case of L∨ apply Cut twice, once on each premise of the
logical rule and then apply the logical rule and in the case of L ⊃
apply Cut before the rule.
7.5 If the left cut premise has been derived by a logical rule where
A is principal, then we consider the derivation according to the form
of the formula. We consider the case where A is a conjunction B&C.
Γ′1 → B Γ′′1 → C
Γ1 → B&C R&
B,C, (B&C)n−1,Γ2 → D
(B&C)n,Γ2 → D L&
B&C,Γ2 → D LC
n−1
Γ1−2 → D Cut
In the derivation
Γ′1 → B Γ′′1 → C
Γ1 → B&C R&
B,C, (B&C)n−1,Γ2 → D
B,C,B&C,Γ2 → D LC
n−2
B,C,Γ1−2 → D Cut
the cut length is shorter. Thus, we have by the induction hypoth-
esis a derivation of the sequent B,C,Γ1−2 → D without Cut. We
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now construct the following derivation, where the grades of the cut
formulas are less.
Γ′1 → B
Γ′′1 → C B,C,Γ1−2 → D
B,Γ′′1 ,Γ1−2 → D
Cut
Γ21,Γ2 → D
Cut
.... contractions
Γ1−2 → D
The other cases of cut formula are treated in a similar manner.
7.6 If the left cut premise has been derived by a contraction, then
we can permute the cut above the rule.
7.7 If the left cut premise has been derived by Ind, then we can
permute the cut above the rule.
8. If rule R is an instance of contraction, where A is not principal,
then we can permute the contractions and the cut above the rule,
diminishing the length of the cut.
9. Suppose rule R is an instance of Ind.
Γ1 → A
Ak,Γ′1 → B(0) Al, B(y),Γ′2 → B(sy) Am, B(t),Γ′3 → D
An,Γ2 → D Ind
A,Γ2 → D LC
n−1
Γ1−2 → D Cut
Here we have Γ2 = Γ
′
1−3 and n = k + l + m. We transform the
derivation as in case 4, diminishing the length of the cuts on A.
This direct proof of cut elimination in Heyting arithmetic is an
extension of the proof given in [23]. Note that unlike Gentzen's origi-
nal proof of cut elimination for sequent calculus in his thesis of 1933,
our proof is carried out without introducing any rule of multicut.
4.4.4 Consistency proof for simple derivations
4.4.9 Deﬁnition. A simple derivation is a derivation without free
variables, without Ind and that contains only atomic formulas.
Thus, in a simple derivation we have only initial sequents, arith-
metical and structural rules, and in addition there are no compound
formulas in the contexts.
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Our aim is now to show that there is no simple derivation of the
empty sequent, but ﬁrst we consider only the case that the derivation
does not contain rule Inf2.
4.4.10 Deﬁnition. We inductively deﬁne if the value of a closed
term is 0 or 1. The constant 0 has value 0. A term of the form s(t)
has value 1. A term of the form t + t′ has value 0 if both t and t′
have value 0 and otherwise it has value 1. A term of the form t · t′
has value 0 if t or t′ has value 0 and otherwise it has value 1.
According to the deﬁnition a closed term has value 0 if it equals
0 and value 1 if it is greater than 0.
4.4.11 Lemma. There is no simple derivation of the empty sequent
without rule Inf2.
Proof. Assume that there is a derivation of the empty sequent with-
out rule Inf2. According to theorem 4.4.8 there is then a derivation
of the empty sequent without Cut (and this new derivation without
Cut is also without Inf2 and Ind). Furthermore, we note that in a
cut-free simple derivation of the empty sequent all sequents have an
empty antecedent, since formulas in the antecedent can only disap-
pear through cut. Therefore, there are no initial sequents or instances
of contraction in the derivation, but only arithmetical rules.
Now, the last rule of the derivation must be Inf1, because all other
rules give as a conclusion a sequent with a formula in the succedent.
Thus, we have a derivation of the sequent → s(t) = 0 for some term
t.
In a simple derivation there are only closed terms and every term
therefore has a value. We now prove by induction on the length of
the derivation that every sequent in the derivation of → s(t) = 0 has
the property that the succedent is a formula t = t′ where t and t′
have the same value.
Base case of the induction. As stated we have no initial se-
quents in the derivation and thus, we only consider the conclusions of
the arithmetical rules without premises as the base case. We want to
prove that the terms of the principal formula in the succedent have
the same value.
In Ref both terms of the principal formula, t = t, have the same
value. In +Rec0 the terms t + 0 and t of the principal formula,
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t + 0 = t, have the same value. In +Recs the principal formula
is of the form t + s(t′) = s(t + t′). Both t + s(t′) and s(t + t′) in
+Recs have the value 1. In ·Rec0 the principal formula is of the form
t · 0 = 0. The constant 0 has the value 0 and the term t · 0 therefore
also has the same value. In ·Recs the principal formula is of the form
t · s(t′) = t · t′ + t. If the term t has the value 1, then both terms
t · s(t′) and t · t′ + t have the value 1. If t on the other hand has the
value 0, then both terms have the value 0.
Induction step. Assume as induction hypothesis that the propo-
sition holds for the premises of an arithmetical rule, that is, that the
terms of the formulas in the succedents of the premises have the same
value.
In Sym we can conclude that if the terms t and t′ in the formula
t = t′ have the same value, then the same applies for the formula
t′ = t in the conclusion. In Tr we can see that if the terms of the
formula t = t′ and t′ = t′′ have the same values, then the terms of
the formula t = t′′ have the same value. In sRep both terms of the
formula s(t) = s(t′) in the conclusion have the value 1. In +Rep1, if
the terms of the formula t = t′ in the premise have the same value,
then also the terms of the formula t + t′′ = t′ + t′′ in the conclusion
have the same value. The same holds for rule +Rep2 and the ·Rep-
rules.
Because all sequents in the derivation have an empty antecedent,
rule Inf1 gives the empty sequent as the conclusion and thus it can
occur only as the last rule in the derivation.
Thus, we have completed the induction and have proved that in
a simple derivation of the sequent → s(t) = 0, all sequents have in
the succedent an equation where the terms have the same value. On
the other hand the terms s(t) and 0 have diﬀerent values. This is a
contradiction and therefore there cannot exist any simple derivation
of the empty sequent.
4.4.12 Lemma. If we have a derivation of a sequent Γ → D, then
there is a derivation of the same length of the sequent where all in-
stances of Sym come directly after arithmetical rules without premises
or after initial sequents.
Proof. Suppose that we have a premise of Sym derived by a rule
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that is not an arithmetical rule without premises. If the rule is a
one-premise arithmetical rule, that is sRep,+Rep, ·Rep, or Inf2, we
can permute the instance of Sym above the other rule. If we have
two instances of Sym, we have a loop and can delete both rules. If
the rule is logical (except L∨), structural or an instance of Inf , we
can also permute Sym above the other rule.
If the rule is an instance of Tr, then the derivation is:
Γ1 → t = t′ Γ2 → t′ = t′′
Γ1−2 → t = t′′ Tr
Γ1−2 → t′′ = t
Sym
We can then instead apply Sym on each premise followed by Tr.
Γ2 → t′ = t′′
Γ2 → t′′ = t′
Sym
Γ1 → t = t′
Γ1 → t′ = t
Sym
Γ1−2 → t′′ = t Tr
This does not alter the length of the derivation. The case of L∨ is
similar.
4.4.13 Lemma. There is a derivation of the sequent → 0 · c = 0
(without Inf2) for every closed term c.
Proof. Firstly we show by induction that for every numeralm we have
a derivation of the sequent → 0 ·m = 0. We can derive → 0 · 0 = 0
with ·Recs. Now assume that m is sn for some numeral n and we
have a derivation of → 0 · n = 0. We then get the derivation
→ 0 · s(n) = 0 · n+ 0 ·Recs
→ 0 · n+ 0 = 0 · n +Rec0 → 0 · n = 0
→ 0 · n+ 0 = 0 Tr
→ 0 · s(n) = 0 Tr
Thus, the proposition holds for every numeral.
For every closed term c there is a numeral m for which the se-
quent → c = m is derivable (without Inf2), this according to lemma
4.4.5(i). We then get the sought derivation
→ c = m
→ 0 · c = 0 ·m ·Rep2 → 0 ·m = 0
→ 0 · c = 0 Tr
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4.4.14 Lemma. If there is a simple derivation of the sequent →
s(t) = s(t′) without the rule Inf2, then there is a simple derivation
of the sequent → t = t′ without Inf2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation. We
assume that if there is a shorter derivation of some sequent→ s(a) =
s(b), then we have a derivation of → a = b without rule Inf2.
Assume that we have a simple derivation of a sequent → s(t) =
s(t′) without Inf2. We can by theorem 4.4.8 assume that the deriva-
tion is cut free. Thus, every sequent in the derivation has an empty
antecedent. By lemma 4.4.12 we can assume that all instances of
Sym come directly after arithmetical rules without premises (note
that there are no initial sequents in the derivation because the an-
tecedents are empty).
We consider the form of the derivation. The last rule can be
sRep,Ref, Sym, or Tr.
1. Assume that the last rule of the derivation is sRep. The
premise of the rule is → t = t′ and we can remove the rule and get
the sought derivation.
2. Assume that the last rule is Ref . Then t ≡ t′ and the sequent
→ t = t′ is also derivable with Ref .
3. Assume that the last rule is Sym. Since the premise of Sym is
derived by an arithmetical rule without premises the only possibility
is that this rule is Ref . The case is treated as in case 2.
4. The remaining possibility is that the last rule is derived by Tr.
We trace up in the derivation along the left premise until we reach a
sequent not derived by Tr. The derivation is of the form
→ s(t) = a1 → a1 = a2
→ s(t) = a2 Tr.... Tr − rules
→ s(t) = an → an = s(t′)
→ s(t) = s(t′) Tr (4.4.15)
where n > 1 and the sequent → s(t) = a1 is not derived by Tr.
If one of the other Tr-premises → ai = ai+1 is derived by Tr
→ s(t) = ai
→ ai = a → a = ai+1
→ ai = ai+1
→ s(t) = ai+1
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we can change the order of the Tr-rules without altering the length
of the derivation.
→ s(t) = ai → ai = a
→ s(t) = a → a = ai+1
→ s(t) = ai+1
Hence, we can assume that the derivation is of the form 4.4.15 and
that none of the premises → ai = ai+1 have been derived by Tr.
When a derivation has the form of derivation 4.4.15, then the right
premises of the two consecutive Tr rules are called adjecent.
If some term ai is of the form s(t
′′), then the sequent → s(t) = ai
is the sequent → s(t) = s(t′′). We can then alter the order of the
Tr-rules and get a derivation of the same length.
→ s(t) = s(t′′)
→ s(t′′) = ai+1....
→ s(t′′) = an → an = s(t′)
→ s(t′′) = s(t′)
→ s(t) = s(t′)
The derivations of the sequents → s(t) = s(t′′) and → s(t′′) = s(t′)
are shorter and we therefore have derivations of the sequents→ t = t′′
and → t′′ = t′. By Tr we get the sought derivation of → t = t′.
We can now assume that the derivation has the form 4.4.15 and
that no term ai has the form s(t
′′). We consider the diﬀerent possi-
bilities to derive the Tr-premises.
4.1 Assume that one of the premises has been derived by Ref .
We now have a loop in the derivation since the conclusion of the
following Tr is the same as the other premise. We can delete the
rule Tr and get a shorter derivation. Thus, we may assume that no
premise has been derived by Ref .
4.2 Assume that two adjacent Tr-premises have been derived by
the same replacement rule +Rep1,+Rep2, ·Rep1, or ·Rep2 or that
three adjacent Tr-premises have been derived by two instances of the
same replacement rule with one instance of the other replacement
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rule in between. As an example we consider the following derivation.
→ s(t) = a+ b
→ b = c
→ a+ b = a+ c +Rep2
→ s(t) = a+ c Tr
→ c = d
→ a+ c = a+ d +Rep2
→ s(t) = a+ d Tr
We can then apply Tr on the premises of the replacement rules
and get a shorter derivation.
→ s(t) = a+ b
→ b = c → c = d
→ b = d Tr
→ a+ b = a+ d +Rep2
→ s(t) = a+ d Tr
Thus, we can assume that we at most have two adjacent Tr-
premises derived by +Rep or ·Rep and that these rules have diﬀerent
indexes.
4.3 Assume that some of the Tr-premises have been derived by
Sym and +Rec0. We consider the rightmost premise derived in this
way. It cannot be the last Tr-premise → an = s(t) since the sequent
is of the form → ai = ai + 0. Thus, the derivation is of the form
→ ai + 0 = ai +Rec0
→ ai = ai + 0 Sym
→ s(t) = ai + 0 Tr? → ai + 0 = b R
→ s(t) = b Tr (4.4.16)
where Tr? indicates that if ai ≡ s(t) we have no rule there, but if
ai 6≡ s(t) we have a Tr-rule there.
RuleR can according to the form of the term be Sym,+Rec0,+Rep1,
or +Rep2 and if the rule is Sym, then the premise can be derived by
·Recs. We consider the diﬀerent alternatives.
4.3.1 Assume that R is +Rec0. Then b ≡ ai. If ai ≡ s(t), then
we have derived an instance of Ref and if ai 6≡ s(t), then we have a
loop in the derivation with the sequent → s(t) = ai two times. By
eliminating the loop we get a shorter derivation.
4.3.2 Assume that R is +Rep1. Now b ≡ c+ 0 and the derivation
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4.4.16 is
→ ai + 0 = ai +Rec0
→ ai = ai + 0 Sym
→ s(t) = ai + 0 Tr?
→ ai = c
→ ai + 0 = c+ 0 +Rep1
→ s(t) = c+ 0 Tr
We can transform the derivation into a shorter derivation.
→ ai = c
→ s(t) = c Tr?
→ c+ 0 = c +Rec0
→ c = c+ 0 Sym
→ s(t) = c+ 0 Tr
4.3.3 Assume that R is Sym and that the premise of this rule is
derived by ·Recs. Now ai ≡ 0 ·c, b ≡ 0 ·s(c) and the derivation 4.4.16
is
→ s(t) = 0 · c
→ 0 · c + 0 = 0 · c +Rec0
→ 0 · c = 0 · c + 0 Sym
→ s(t) = 0 · c + 0 Tr
→ 0 · s(c) = 0 · c + 0 ·Recs
→ 0 · c + 0 = 0 · s(c) Sym
→ s(t) = 0 · s(c) Tr
According to lemma 4.4.13 there is a derivation of the sequent
→ 0 · s(c) = 0 (without rule Inf2). With Tr we get a derivation of
the sequent → s(t) = 0 without Inf2. Thus, applying Inf1 we get a
derivation of the empty sequent without Inf2. This is a contradiction
according to lemma 4.4.11.
4.3.4 Assume that R is +Rep2. Then b ≡ ai + c and we have
another Tr-premise to the right derived by a rule R′. The derivation
4.4.16 is
→ ai + 0 = ai +Rec0
→ ai = ai + 0 Sym
→ s(t) = ai + 0
Tr?
→ 0 = c
→ ai + 0 = ai + c +Rep2
→ s(t) = ai + c
Tr → ai + c = d R
′
→ s(t) = d Tr (4.4.17)
Considering the form of the formula ai + c = d the rule R
′ can be
Sym,+Rec0,+Recs, or +Rep1 (note that according to 4.2 the rule
cannot be +Rep2) and if it is Sym, then the Sym-premise can only
be derived by ·Recs. We consider the diﬀerent possibilities.
4.4. The consistency of Heyting arithmetic 63
4.3.4.1 Assume that R′ is +Rec0. The derivation is treated as in
case 4.3.1.
4.3.4.2 Assume that R′ is +Recs. Now c ≡ s(e) and d ≡ s(ai+e).
The sequent → 0 = c is then → 0 = s(e). This gives a contradiction
as in case 4.3.3.
4.3.4.3 Assume that R′ is +Rep1. Now d ≡ ai + e and the
derivation 4.4.17 is
→ ai + 0 = ai +Rec0
→ ai = ai + 0 Sym
→ s(t) = ai + 0
Tr?
→ 0 = c
→ ai + 0 = ai + c +Rep2
→ s(t) = ai + c
Tr
→ ai = e
→ ai + c = e + c +Rep1
→ s(t) = e + c Tr
We can transform the derivation into a shorter derivation.
→ ai = e
→ e+ 0 = e +Rec0
→ e = e+ 0 Sym
→ ai = e+ 0 Tr
→ 0 = c
→ e+ 0 = e+ c +Rep2
→ ai = e+ c Tr
→ s(t) = e+ c Tr?
4.3.4.4 Assume that R′ is Sym and that the Sym-premise has
been derived by ·Recs. Now ai ≡ c · e, d ≡ c · s(e) and the conclusion
of derivation 4.4.17 is → s(t) = c · s(e). We get a simple derivation
of the sequent → s(t) = 0 without Inf2, since according to lemma
4.4.13 we have a simple derivation of the sequent → 0 · s(e) = 0.
→ s(t) = c · s(e)
→ 0 = c
→ c = 0 Sym
→ c · s(e) = 0 · s(e) ·Rep1
→ s(t) = 0 · s(e) Tr → 0 · s(e) = 0
→ s(t) = 0 Tr
This is a contradiction as in case 4.3.3.
We have now treated all the possibilities of rule R′ and case 4.3.4
is ﬁnished. We have also treated all cases in 4.3 and thus, we can
assume that no Tr-premise in derivation 4.4.15 has been derived by
Sym and +Rec0.
4.4 We consider derivation 4.4.15. The leftmost Tr-premise →
s(t) = a1 can only be derived by Sym and the premise of Sym by
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+Recs. The following Tr-premise can be derived by +Rep1,+Rep2,
Sym, or +Recs and if it is derived by Sym, then the Sym-premise is
derived by ·Recs. We treat the diﬀerent cases simultaneously, since
the derivation will ultimately have the same form disregarding some
Rep-rules and possible instances of ·Recs. According to case 4.2 we
can only have two adjacent Tr-premises derived by the +Rep-rules.
We assume that we have one premise derived by +Rep1 and one by
+Rep2. The following Tr-premise can be derived by +Recs,+Rec0,
or Sym and ·Recs. If it is derived by +Rec0 we get a contradiction
as in case 4.3.3. We assume that the premise is derived by Sym and
·Recs. The following two premises can be derived by ·Rep1 and ·Rep2
and the next only by ·Recs, because if it is derived by ·Rec0 we have a
contradiction as in case 4.3.3. Again we can have two +Rep-rules and
a number of repetitions of the rules ·Recs, ·Rep1, ·Rep2, ·Recs,+Rep1
and +Rep2. The last Tr-premise is derived by +Recs.
Hence, the derivation has the following form (where we have left
out the sequent arrow and unnecessary parentheses):
a + sb = s(a + b)
+Recs
s(a + b) = a + sb
Sym
a = c
a + sb = c + sb
+Rep1
s(a + b) = c + sb
Tr
sb = d
c + sb = c + d
+Rep2
s(a + b) = c + d
Tr
From the rule ·Recs we have c ≡ d · e.
....
s(a+ b) = c+ d
d · se = c+ d ·Recs
c+ d = d · se Sym
s(a+ b) = d · se Tr
d = f
d · se = f · se ·Rep1
s(a+ b) = f · se Tr
From the rule ·Recs we have g ≡ sh.
....
s(a+ b) = f · se
se = g
f · se = f · g ·Rep2
s(a+ b) = f · g Tr f · g = f · h+ f ·Recs
s(a+ b) = f · h+ f Tr
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s(a + b) = f · h + f
f · h = c2
f · h + f = c2 + f +Rep1
s(a + b) = c2 + f
Tr
f = d2
c2 + f = c2 + d2
+Rep2
s(a + b) = c2 + d2
Tr
From the formula s(a+b) = c2 +d2 we can have a repetition of ·Recs
and Rep-rules. If we have n − 1 repetitions, where n > 1, then the
end of the derivation is
....
s(a+ b) = cn + dn cn + dn = s(a2 + b2)
+Recs
s(a+ b) = s(a2 + b2)
Tr
(4.4.18)
Here we have cn ≡ a2 and dn ≡ sb2 and also a2 + b2 ≡ t′.
If in the derivation we have at least one row of the speciﬁed rules,
that is, if n > 1, then we show that we can derive ci = ci+1 and
di = di+1. If we don't have all Rep-rules in the derivation, then we
have identities instead of equations and the derivation is shorter.
In the derivation we have subderivations of the formulas di = fi
and fi · hi = ci+1 and we also have the identity ci ≡ di · ei. Since
gi ≡ shi and we have a subderivation of sei = gi, that is sei = shi,
we have by the induction hypothesis a derivation of ei = hi. Thus,
we can construct a derivation of ci = ci+1.
di = fi
di · ei = fi · ei
·Rep1
ei = hi
fi · ei = fi · hi
·Rep2
di · ei = fi · hi Tr fi · hi = ci+1
di · ei = ci+1 Tr
On the other hand we get di = di+1 with Tr from di = fi and
fi = di+1.
With Tr we get derivations of c = cn and d = dn. We now
construct a derivation of t = t′, that is a + b = a2 + b2. From the
subderivation of a = c and the derivation of c = cn, we get with Tr
a derivation of a = cn. Since cn ≡ a2 we now have a derivation of
a = a2.
From the subderivation of sb = d and the derivation of d = dn
we get with Tr a derivation of sb = dn. Since dn ≡ sb2 we have a
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derivation of sb = sbn and this derivation is shorter. According to
the induction hypothesis we have a derivation of b = bn. We now get
the sought derivation
a = a2
a+ b = a2 + b
+Rep1
b = b2
a2 + b = a2 + b2
+Rep2
a+ b = a2 + b2
Tr
Hence, we have treated case 4.4 and also case 4 is ﬁnished.
4.4.19 Lemma. If there is a simple derivation of the sequent → t =
t′, then there is a derivation of the same sequent without rule Inf2
Proof. Assume that the sequent→ t = t′ is derivable with at least one
instance of Inf2 in the derivation. Then take an uppermost instance
of Inf2. The premise of this rule is → s(u) = s(v). According to
lemma 4.4.14 the conclusion of the rule→ u = v is derivable without
Inf2. Thus, we can replace the subderivation with this derivation
without Inf2. In this way we can remove every instance of Inf2 in
the derivation.
4.4.20 Lemma. There is no simple derivation of the empty sequent.
Proof. Assume that we have a simple derivation of the empty se-
quent. According to theorem 4.4.8 there is a cut-free derivation of
the sequent. The last rule of this derivation must be Inf1 with a
premise → s(t) = 0 because all other rules give as the conclusion a
sequent with a formula in the succedent. According to lemma 4.4.19
the premise is derivable without Inf2. Therefore, we also have a
derivation of the empty sequent without Inf2. This is a contradic-
tion according to lemma 4.4.11 and thus, there cannot be any simple
derivation of the empty sequent.
Gentzen and Takeuti use semantical arguments in their proofs of
this lemma, while we managed to complete the proof using purely
proof-theoretical means. Takeuti proves that there is either a false
formula in the antecedent of a sequent in a simple proof or a true
formula in the succedent. He needs these semantical arguments be-
cause he has arbitrary initial sequents in his system only speciﬁed
by the requirement that they have a true atomic formula with closed
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terms in the succedent or a false formula in the antecedent. We man-
aged to abolish the semantical arguments of the lemma through our
formulation of the system HA.
4.4.5 The reduction procedure for derivations
We can now begin to describe the actual reduction procedure for
derivations of the empty sequent. The main idea of the proof is that
we ﬁrst substitute free variables in the derivation. Then according to
the form of the derivation we convert inductions or cuts on compound
formulas with predecessors in arithmetical rules or initial sequents.
If this is not possible, then we have a so-called suitable cut. If we
have a suitable cut, then we can introduce cuts on formulas of a
lower grade. The problematic case is that if there are contractions on
the cut formula we cannot directly convert the suitable cut into cuts
on formulas of lower grade. The problem is solved by the so-called
height lines that are permuted up in the derivation by introducing
additional cuts on formulas of lower grade, lowering the ordinal of
the derivation.
4.4.21 Lemma (Reduction Procedure). If P is a derivation of the
empty sequent → in which the arithmetical rules are applied before
the logical and structural rules, then there exists a derivation P ′ of
the empty sequent such that o(P ′) < o(P ).
Proof. The proof describes a reduction procedure where a derivation
P is transformed into a derivation P ′ with a lower ordinal. The
reduction consists of several steps, which are performed as many times
as possible before proceeding to the next step and the reduction ends
when a derivation with a lower ordinal is reached.
Let P be a derivation of the empty sequent →. We may assume
that the eigenvariables of the rules are diﬀerent and that an eigen-
variable occurs only above the rule in the derivation.
Step 1. If there are any free variables in the derivation that
are not eigenvariables, we substitute them with the constant 0. The
derivation that results from this process is also a valid derivation of
the empty sequent and it has the same ordinal as P .
Step 2. If the end-piece of P contains an induction, then we
perform the following reduction. Assume I to be one of the last
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inductions of the derivation.
....
Γ1
µ1→ A(0)
P0(x)....
A(x),Γ2
µ2→ A(sx)
....
A(t),Γ3
µ3→ D (l)
Γ1−3 → D (k) I....→
Here P0(x) is the subderivation ending with A(x),Γ2 → A(sx) and S
is the sequent Γ1−3 → D. The premises of I all have the same height,
l. Let k be the height of the conclusion of the rule and let µi, where
i = 1, 2, 3, be the ordinals of the premises. Now the conclusion has
the ordinal o(Γ1−3 → D;P ) = ωl−k+1(µ1#µ2#µ3).
The term t in the third premise of the rule does not contain any
free variable since they were substituted in step 1. Neither does t
contain any eigenvariables because I is the last rule with an eigen-
variable in the derivation. Thus, t is a closed term and there exists a
number n, for which the sequent → t = n is derivable without induc-
tions or cuts (this according to lemma 4.4.6(i)). Therefore, we have
a derivation, Q, of the sequent A(n)→ A(t) also without inductions
or cuts. This according to lemma 4.4.6(iv).
The derivation P can now be reduced to P ′ according to the
following principle if n > 0. If n equals 0 the corresponding reduction
is used but no contractions are needed and instead the missing context
Γ2 is added in the derivation.) Let P0(m) be the derivation that
results from P0(x) when every occurrence of x is substituted with m
and let Π be the derivation:
....
Γ1 → A(0)
P0(0)....
A(0),Γ2 → A(s0)
Γ1,Γ2 → A(s0) Cut
P0(1)....
A(s0),Γ2 → A(ss0)
Γ1,Γ
2
2 → A(ss0)
Cut
....
Γ1,Γ
n
2 → A(n)
We reduce P to the following derivation P ′ where Π is a sub-
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derivation:
Π....
Γ1,Γ
n
2 → A(n)
Q
....
A(n)→ A(t)
Γ1,Γ
n
2 → A(t)
Cut
....
A(t),Γ3 → D
Γ1,Γ
n
2 ,Γ3 → D
Cut
.... Contractions
Γ1−3 → D....→
All cuts shown in Π and P ′ are on formulas of the same grade,
so all cut premises have the same height l. Therefore, the ordinals
of the premises of the ﬁrst cut in Π are o(Γ1 → A(0);P ′) = µ1 and
o(A(0),Γ2 → A(s0);P ′) = µ2. The ordinal of the conclusion, S′1, is
then o(S′1) = ωl−l(µ1#µ2) = µ1#µ2. The conclusion of the second
cut, S′2, then has the ordinal o(S
′
3) = µ1#µ2#µ2 and so on. If we
write µ ∗m = µ#µ# . . .#µ(m times) we get o(S′m) = µ1#(µ2 ∗m)
for every m = 1, . . . , n. If we denote the ordinal of Q by q, we
have o(A(n) → A(t)) = q < ω because Q does not contain any
inductions or cuts. Because each of the ordinals µ1, µ2 ∗ n, q, and
µ3 are less than ω
µ1#µ2#µ3 , the sum is also less, that is we have
the inequality µ1#(µ2 ∗ n)#q#µ3 < ωµ1#µ2#µ3 . From this follows
that o(S;P ′) = ωk−l(µ1#(µ2 ∗ n)#q#µ3) < ωl−k+1(µ1#µ2#µ3) =
o(S;P ), that is o(S;P ′) < o(S;P ). According to lemma 4.4.4 we
then have o(P ′) < o(P ).
Thus, if there is an induction in the end-piece we have reduced
the derivation. Otherwise we can assume that the end-piece is free
from inductions.
Step 3. Assume that there is a compound formula E in the end-
piece of the derivation. Let I be the cut in the end-piece where the
formula disappears. No predecessor of the formula in the left cut
premise can be derived by an arithmetical rule that borders on the
end-piece since the formula E has logical structure. Now assume that
a predecessor of the formula in the right cut premise has been derived
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by an arithmetical rule that borders on the end-piece.
....
Γ1 → E
E,Γ′2 → D′
Arithm.
....
E,Γ2 → D (k)
Γ1−2 → D (l) I....→
Above the arithmetical rule that borders on the end-piece we have
only other arithmetical rules and initial sequents (this according to
the assumption made in the beginning of the proof.) The formula E
is therefore not principal in any rule above the arithmetical rule and
it cannot be introduced in an initial sequent as the formula on both
sides either, since no succedent of a sequent above the arithmetical
rule can be compound.
Hence, the formula E has been introduced in the context of an
arithmetical rule without premises or in an initial sequent and we can
eliminate the formula and trace down in the derivation deleting the
formula in the context of every arithmetical rule. Thus, the derivation
that results from this process is a derivation of the sequent Γ′2 → D′
that is otherwise similar to the derivation of E,Γ′2 → D′.
We now divide the reduction into two cases depending on whether
we have any contractions on the formula E between the arithmetical
rule that borders on the end-piece and the cut I where the formula
disappears.
Case 1. Assume that there are no contractions on the formula
E between the arithmetical rule and I. We now continue deleting
every occurrence of E and also the cut I, instead adding the missing
context Γ1 in the antecedent. Thus, we have a valid derivation of the
sequent Γ1−2 → D and the derivation P ′ is as follows:
Γ1,Γ
′
2 → D′
Arithm.
....
Γ1−2 → D....→
Now in order to calculate the ordinal of the new derivation let S
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be a sequent in P above E,Γ2 → D and let S′ be the corresponding
sequent in P ′. We then show by induction on the number of inferences
up to E,Γ2 → D that the following inequality holds
ωk1−k2(o(S;P )) > o(S′;P ′), (4.4.22)
where k1 = h(S;P ) and k2 = h(S
′;P ′) and thus k1 > k2.
If S is an initial sequent or the conclusion of an arithmetical rule
without premises, then o(S;P ) = o(S′;P ′) = 1 and the proposition
holds. Now assume that the sequent S has been derived with a rule
and that the claim holds for its premises. If S has been derived with
contraction, the heights and the ordinals of the conclusions S and S′
are the same as for the premises and the proposition holds.
If S has been derived with an arithmetical or logical one-premise
rule then the heights of the conclusions are the same as for the
premises. If we let the ordinals of the premises be α and α′ we get
ωk1−k2(o(S;P )) = ωk1−k2(α+ 1) > ωk1−k2(α). Since the claim holds
for the premises, that is ωk1−k2(α) > α′, we get ωk1−k2(α + 1) > α′
and furthermore, ωk1−k2(α+ 1) > α′ + 1 and the proposition holds.
If S has been derived with an arithmetical or logical two-premise
rule then again the heights of the conclusions are the same as for
the premises. If we let the ordinals of the premises be α, β and
α′, β′ we have the following inequalities for the premises of the rules
ωk1−k2(α) > α′ and ωk1−k2(β) > β′. If k1 = k2, then we get from
the inequalities of the premises α > α′ and β > β′ the inequal-
ity ωk1−k2(o(S;P )) = o(S;P ) = α#β > α′#β′. On the other
hand if k1 > k2, then we get ωk1−k2(α#β) > ωk1−k2(α) > α′ and
ωk1−k2(α#β) > ωk1−k2(β) > β′. This gives ωk1−k2(α#β) > α′#β′
and the proposition holds.
If S has been derived with a cut the premises of which have the
heightm1 and the ordinals α and β and S
′ has been derived with a cut
the premises of which have the height m2 and the ordinals α
′ and β′,
then we have the following inequalities for the premises ωm1−m2(α) >
α′ and ωm1−m2(β) > β′. We then get ωk1−k2(o(S;P )) = ωk1−k2
(ωm1−k1(α#β)) = ωm1−k2(α#β) = ωm2−k2(ωm1−m2(α#β)). Ifm1 =
m2 then from the inequalities of the premises α > α′ and β > β′
we get the inequality ωm2−k2(ωm1−m2(α#β)) = ωm2−k2(α#β) >
ωm2−k2(α
′#β′). Ifm1 > m2 then we get ωm1−m2(α#β) > ωm1−m2(α)
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> α′ and ωm1−m2(α#β) > ωm1−m2(β) > β′. Thus, we get ωm1−m2
(α#β) > α′#β′ and from this follows that ωm2−k2(ωm1−m2(α#β)) >
ωm2−k2(α
′#β′), that is the proposition holds.
If S has been derived with an Ind the premises of which have the
height m1 and the ordinals α, β and γ and S
′ has been derived with
an Ind the premises of which have the height m2 and the ordinals
α′, β′ and γ′ then we have the following inequalities for the premises
ωm1−m2(α) > α′, ωm1−m2(β) > β′ and ωm1−m2(γ) > γ′. We then
have
ωk1−k2(o(S;P )) = ωk1−k2(ωm1−k1+1(α#β#γ))
= ωm1−k2+1(α#β#γ)
= ωm2−k2+1(ωm1−m2(α#β#γ))
> ωm2−k2+1(α′#β′#γ′) = o(S′;P ′)
Thus, it has been proved that inequality 4.4.22 holds.
Now let S be the sequent E,Γ2 → D and S′ the corresponding
sequent Γ1−2 → D. If we let o(Γ1 → E;P ) = µ1, o(E,Γ2 → D;P ) =
µ2, o(Γ1−2 → D;P ) = ν and o(Γ1−2 → D;P ′) = ν′ and also let
h(Γ1−2 → D;P ) = l and h(E,Γ2 → D;P ) = k, then we have l 6 k
and h(Γ1−2 → D;P ′) = l. From the inequality we get
ωk−l(µ2) > ν′
and from this follows the inequality
ν = ωk−l(µ1#µ2) > ωk−l(µ2) > ν′.
According to lemma 4.4.4 we can conclude that o(P ) > o(P ′).
Case 2. Assume that there is at least one contraction on the
formula E between the arithmetical rule and I. Let the uppermost
contraction be I ′. Recall that we have a derivation of the sequent
Γ′2 → D′ that is otherwise similar to the derivation of E,Γ′2 → D′.
We can now reduce the derivation on the left into the one on the right
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by eliminating the contraction.
E,Γ′2 → D′
Arithm.
....
E,E,Γ′′2 → D′′
E,Γ′′2 → D′′
I′
....
E,Γ2 → D....
 
Γ′2 → D′
Arithm.
....
E,Γ′′2 → D′′....
E,Γ2 → D....
In this reduction the ordinal is preserved and o(P ) = o(P ′). We
now repeat step 3 if we can or continue with step 4 and assume that
compound formulas in the end-piece of P do not have predecessors
in arithmetical rules that border on the end-piece. Therefore, these
formulas must have predecessors in initial sequents or logical rules
that border on the end-piece.
Step 4. Assume that the end-piece contains an initial sequent
D,Γ → D. Since the end-sequent is empty both formulas D (or
rather descendants of both formulas) must disappear through cuts.
Assume that the D in the antecedent is the ﬁrst formula to disappear
in a cut (the other case is similar). The derivation P now has the
form
....
Γ1 → D
D,Γ→ D
....
D,Γ2 → D
Γ1−2 → D Cut....→
We can reduce P into a derivation P ′ where the cut has been elim-
inated by adding the missing context Γ2 in the antecedent of the
derivation of the left premise.
Since both D's from the sequent D,Γ → D disappear through
cuts, we have a cut on the other D in the succedent below the sequent
Γ1−2 → D. Therefore, the heights of the sequents remain unchanged,
while the ordinal of the subderivation ending with Γ1−2 → D de-
creases. Thus, we get o(P ′) < o(P ) by lemma 4.4.4.
We can now proceed to step 5 and can assume that the end-piece
does not contain any initial sequents but only cuts and contractions.
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Step 5. To continue the reduction procedure we consider the
compound cut formulas of the end-piece. We want to diminish the
ordinal of the derivation by introducing cuts on shorter formulas. For
this we need a suitable cut in the end-piece.
4.4.23 Deﬁnition. A cut in the end-piece of a derivation is a suit-
able cut if both copies of the cut formula have predecessors that are
principal in logical rules that border on the end-piece.
4.4.24 Sublemma. Assume that a derivation P fulﬁlls the following
requirements:
1. the end-piece of P contains at least one cut on a compound
formula.
2. In every cut on a compound formula in the end-piece each copy
of the cut formula has a predecessor in the conclusion of a logical
rule that borders on the end-piece.
3. The principal formula of the logical rule mentioned in point (2)
has a descendant that disappears through a cut in the end-piece.
Then P has a suitable cut.
Proof. The proof is an induction on the number of cuts on compound
cut formulas in the end-piece.
In the end-piece of P there is at least one cut on a compound
formula according to point (1). If there is only one cut, then the cut
formulas of both premises have a predecessor in a logical rule border-
ing on the end-piece according to point (2). If the principal formula
of the rule was not the predecessor of the cut formula, then, according
to point (3), it would have to disappear through another cut in the
end-piece. Thus, the principal formula has to be the predecessor of
the only cut and we have a suitable cut.
Now assume that P has n cuts on compound formulas in the
end-piece. As induction hypothesis we have that any derivation with
fewer such cuts has a suitable cut, provided that the derivation fulﬁls
the stipulated requirements. Let I be the last of the cuts on some
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compound formula, D.
P1....
Γ1 → D
P2....
D,Γ2 → E
Γ1−2 → E I
If I is a suitable cut the proposition is proved. Therefore, we assume
that I is not a suitable cut. Both cut formulas of the premises have,
according to point (2) a predecessor in the conclusion of a logical
rule bordering on the end-piece. Since the cut is not a suitable cut a
predecessor of one D is not principal in one of the logical rules. We
may assume that this is the case for the D in the premise Γ1 → D.
According to point (3) a descendant of the principal formula in the
logical rule disappears through a cut. If this cut was I, then the
principal formula would be D, but then I would be a suitable cut.
Therefore, there must be another cut on a compound formula and
this cut is above I in P1 since I was the last cut. Thus, P1 satisﬁes
point (1). P1 also inherits property (2) from P . None of the principal
formulas in the logical rules bordering on the end-piece can disappear
through the cut I, since that would make I a suitable cut, therefore
the cuts must be in P1 and P1 fulﬁlls criterion (3). With that, the
subderivation P1 fulﬁlls all three requirements and according to the
induction hypothesis has a suitable cut. This is also a suitable cut of
the derivation P .
We now continue to consider the derivation P of the empty se-
quent. If the derivation P contained only atomic formulas, then any
instances of Ind would be in the end-piece, but this is not possible
since these were reduced in step 2. Hence, the derivation P contains
a compound formula, for otherwise the derivation would be simple
which is impossible according to lemma 4.4.20. Since the end-sequent
is empty and the end-piece does not contain any instances of Ind all
formulas in the end-piece must disappear through cuts. At least one
of these formulas has logical structure. The derivation P therefore
satisﬁes the ﬁrst criterion in sublemma 4.4.24. Assume that D is
a compound formula that disappears though a cut in the end-piece.
The formula D cannot have a predecessor in an arithmetical rule that
borders on the end-piece, since these were treated in step 3. Neither
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can a predecessor of D have been introduced in an initial sequent in
the end-piece, since these were treated in step 4. The only remaining
possibility is that the formula has a predecessor in the conclusion of
a logical rule bordering on the end-piece. This means that P satisﬁes
the second criterion in sublemma 4.4.24. From the fact that the end-
sequent is empty and that there are no inductions in the end-piece
we draw the conclusion that P satisﬁes the third criterion in lemma
4.4.24. Therefore, P fulﬁlls all the requirements of the sublemma and
P contains a suitable cut.
Now consider the lowermost suitable cut I and perform the fol-
lowing reduction according to the form of the cut formula.
Case 1. Assume that the cut formula of the last suitable cut is
a conjunction B&C. Now P has the form
....
Γ′′1 → B
....
Γ′′′1 → C
Γ′1 → B&C
R&
....
Γ1
µ→ B&C
....
B,C,Γ′2 → D′
B&C,Γ′2 → D′
L&
....
B&C,Γ2
ν→ D (l)
Γ1−2 → D I....
Θ
λ→ E (k)
....→
where Γ′1 = Γ
′′
1 ,Γ
′′′
1 and Θ→ E is the ﬁrst sequent below I that has
a lower height than the premises of the cut. Such a sequent exists
because the height of the end-sequent is 0 while the cut premises have
a height of at least 1. Let l be the height of the premises of the cut I
and let h(Θ→ E;P ) = k. Then we have k < l. The sequent Θ→ E
must be the conclusion of a cut since the end-piece only contains
contractions and cuts and the conclusion of a contraction has the
same height as the premise. Furthermore, we let o(Γ1 → B&C) =
µ, o(B&C,Γ2 → D) = ν and o(Θ→ E) = λ.
In the derivation of B,C,Γ′2 → D′ we can add the formula B&C in
the context and get a derivation of the sequent B&C,B,C,Γ′2 → D′.
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Now let P3 be the following derivation:
....
Γ1
µ3→ B&C
....
B&C,B,C,Γ′2 → D′....
B&C,B,C,Γ2
ν3→ D
B,C,Γ1−2 → D J3....
B,C,Θ→ E
We take the derivation of Γ′′1 → B and instead of applying a
right conjunction rule we add the missing formulas Γ′′′1 in the context
and get a derivation of the sequent Γ′1 → B. Then we apply the
cuts and contractions above the left premise of the cut J3 shown
in P3 (this is possible because the descendant of the conjunction in
the succedent disappears through the cut J3 and therefore cannot be
principal in another rule above the cut.) Hence, we have constructed
a derivation of the sequent Γ1 → B. We again instead of applying the
cut J3 add the missing context Γ2 and get a derivation of Γ1−2 → B.
After this we continue with the same rules as below P3 applying the
same rules on the same formulas if we have a contraction or a cut
on formulas in the antecedent. If we on the other hand in P3 have
a cut on the formula in the succedent (that is a cut on the formula
in P3 that has been replaced by the formula B in the constructed
derivation) we instead of applying the cut add the missing context in
the antecedent of the sequent. Thus, we get a valid derivation of the
sequent Θ → B and we call this derivation P1. Correspondingly we
construct a derivation of the sequent Θ→ C from the derivation P3
and call this derivation P2.
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We now compose the three derivations into the derivation P ′:
P1....
Θ
λ1→ B
P2....
Θ
λ2→ C
P3....
B,C,Θ
λ3→ E (m2)
B,Θ2 → E (m1)
Cut
Θ3
λ0→ E (k)
Cut
.... contractions
Θ→ E....→
Let m1 be the height of the premises of the cut on the formula B
and let m2 be the height of the premises of the cut on the formula C.
The premises of the cut J3 in P
′ have the height l because all cuts
below the premises of the cut I also occur below J3. And both added
cuts have a lower grade than the cut formula B&C. Furthermore, we
have that h(Θ3 → E;P ′) = k.
Assume that the grade of B is higher than or equal to the grade
of C (otherwise we may exchange the order of the two cuts). Now we
have m1 = m2. If k is higher than the grade of B (and the grade of
C), then we have that k = m1 = m2 and if not m1 equals the grade
of B. In both cases we have k 6 m1.
Let
λ0 = o(Θ
3 → E;P ′)
λ1 = o(Θ→ B;P ′)
λ2 = o(Θ→ C;P ′)
λ3 = o(B,C,Θ→ E;P ′)
µ3 = o(Γ1 → B&C;P ′)
ν3 = o(B&C,B,C,Γ2 → D;P ′)
Then we have that ν3 < ν since the heights of the sequents above
remain unchanged and a logical rule has been removed. Furthermore,
we have that µ3 = µ.
Now let
S′1 S
′
2
S′
J′
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be an arbitrary rule between J3 and the sequent B,C,Θ→ E in the
subderivation P3 of P
′ and let
S1 S2
S
J
be the corresponding rule between I and Θ→ E in P . Let
α′1 = o(S
′
1;P
′) α′2 = o(S
′
2;P
′) α′ = o(S′;P ′)
α1 = o(S1;P ) α2 = o(S2;P ) α = o(S;P )
k1 = h(S
′
1;P ) = h(S
′
2;P
′) k2 = h(S′;P ′)
Then we have that α = α1#α2 if S
′ is not the sequent B,C,Θ→
E and α = ωl−k(α1#α2) if S′ is the sequent B,C,Θ → E. On the
other hand we have that α′ = ωk1−k2(α
′
1#α
′
2).
We show by induction on the number of inferences between J3
and S′ that
α′ < ωl−k2(α) (4.4.25)
if S′ is not the sequent B,C,Θ→ E.
If J ′ is J3 then we have that
α′ = ωl−k2(µ3#ν3) < ωl−k2(µ#ν) = ωl−k2(α)
because µ3 = µ and ν3 < ν.
If we assume that the inequality holds for the premises of J ′, that
is α′1 < ωl−k1(α1) and α
′
2 < ωl−k1(α2) then we get that α
′
1#α
′
2 is less
than ωl−k1(α1)#ωl−k1(α2), this implies that α
′
1#α
′
2 < ωl−k1(α1#α2).
From this follows that the inequality holds for the conclusion, because
we have
α′ = ωk1−k2(α
′
1#α
′
2) < ωk1−k2(ωl−k1(α1#α2))
= ωl−k2(α1#α2) = ωl−k2(α).
Thus, it is proved that the inequality 4.4.25 holds.
The inequality 4.4.25 holds for the premises of the cut that gives
the sequent B,C,Θ → E. The premises have the height l = k2
and if we denote the ordinals of the premises α′1 and α
′
2 and for the
corresponding premises in P , α1 and α2, we get from the inequalities
of the premises that α′1 < ωl−l(α1) = α1 and α
′
2 < ωl−l(α2) = α2
hold. From this follows that λ3 = ωl−m2(α
′
1#α
′
2) < ωl−m2(α1#α2) =
ωl−m2(κ), if we let λ = ωl−k(κ).
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Then remains to calculate corresponding inequalities for the ordi-
nals of the other subderivations P1 and P2. We consider the deriva-
tion P1. There are two possibilities to consider, namely, that the
last cut above the sequent Θ → E in P3 has been eliminated in the
construction of P1 and the possibility that there is a corresponding
cut above the sequent Θ → B in P1. We show that in both cases
λ1 6 λ3.
Assume that there is a corresponding cut in P1. The conclusion of
the cut in P3 has the height m2, the premises have the height l > m2
and the cut formula has the grade l. The cut formula of the cuts
between J3 and the cut in question have a grade lower or equal to
l. Thus, all heights remain unchanged when the cuts are removed in
P1. And we conclude that λ1 6 λ3.
Now, assume for the other case that the last cut above the se-
quent Θ → B has been eliminated. This means that the heights of
the corresponding sequents in P1 and P3 are no longer equal. We
deﬁne the notion height diﬀerence to be able to inductively prove the
inequality we want.
4.4.26 Deﬁnition. Let the premises of a cut or an induction have
the height g and the conclusion the height h. The height diﬀerence
of the cut or the induction is g − h for the cut and g − h+ 1 for the
induction. The height diﬀerence between two sequents in a derivation
is the sum of the height diﬀerences for all cuts and inductions between
the two sequents.
The height diﬀerence between two sequents is equal to the height
of the uppermost sequent, minus the height of the lowermost sequent,
plus the number of inductions between the sequents.
Let S be a sequent in P3 with the ordinal α and S
′ the corre-
sponding sequent in P1 with the ordinal α
′. We show by induction
that
α′ 6 ωh−h′(α) (4.4.27)
where h is the height diﬀerence between S and the conclusion of the
subderivation P3, that is B,C,Θ→ E and h′ is the height diﬀerence
between S′ and the conclusion of the subderivation P1, that is Θ→ B.
The expression is well deﬁned if h > h′. The sequents B,C,Θ→
E and Θ → B have the same height m1 = m2 and the number of
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inductions between S and B,C,Θ→ E and between S′ and Θ→ B
is the same. Since the cut formulas below S′ also occur below S we
have that the height of S is greater or equal to the height of S′. This
means that h > h′ and the expression is well deﬁned. We can now
proceed to proving the inequality 4.4.27.
If S is an initial sequent or the conclusion of an arithmetical rule
without premises, then α′ = α = 1 and the inequality holds regardless
of the size of h− h′.
Assume that the inequality holds for the premise of a one-premise
rule. Let the height diﬀerence under the premise in P3 be h and in P1
h′ and let the ordinals of the premises be α and α′ respectively. The
height diﬀerences under the conclusions are the same. If the rule is
a contraction the inequality of the premises is preserved. If the rule
is logical or arithmetical then we get α′ 6 ωh−h′(α) < ωh−h′(α + 1)
and from this α′ + 1 6 ωh−h′(α+ 1).
Assume that the inequality holds for the premises of a two-premise
arithmetical or logical rule, that is α′1 6 ωh−h′(α1) and α′2 6 ωh−h′(α2)
hold. Here α1 and α2 are the ordinals of the premises in P3 and α
′
1 and
α′2 are the ordinals of the premises in P1. The height diﬀerences un-
der the premises, h and h′, are the same as under the conclusion. We
then get α′ = α′1#α
′
2 6 ωh−h′(α1)#ωh−h′(α2) 6 ωh−h′(α1#α2) =
ωh−h′(α).
Assume that the inequality holds for the premises of a cut in P3,
that is α′1 6 ωh−h′(α1) and α′2 6 ωh−h′(α2) hold. If the cut has been
eliminated in P1, then S
′ has the ordinal α′1. Let the height diﬀerence
of the cut be g in P3. Now the height diﬀerence under S is h − g
and we get the inequality α′ = α′1 6 ωh−h′(α1) < ωh−h′(α1#α2) =
ω(h−g)−h′(ωg(α1#α2)) = ω(h−g)−h′(α). On the other hand if the
cut also occurs in P1, in other words if it has not been eliminated,
we let the height diﬀerence in P1 be g
′. Now the height diﬀerence
under S is h − g and under S′ h′ − g′ and we get the inequality
for the conclusion α′ = ωg′(α′1#α
′
2) 6 ωg′(ωh−h′(α1)#ωh−h′(α2)) 6
ωg′(ωh−h′(α1#α2)) = ωg′+h−h′−g(ωg(α1#α2)) = ω(h−g)−(h′−g′)(α).
Lastly assume that the inequality holds for the premises of an
instance of Ind, that is α′1 6 ωh−h′(α1), α′2 6 ωh−h′(α2) and α′3 6
ωh−h′(α3). Let the height diﬀerence for the induction in P1 be g′
and in P3 g. Now the height diﬀerence under S is h − g and un-
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der S′ h′ − g′ and we get the inequality α′ = ωg′(α′1#α′2#α′3) 6
ωg′(ωh−h′(α1)#ωh−h′(α2)#ωh−h′(α3)) 6 ωg′(ωh−h′(α1#α2#α3)) =
ωg′+h−h′−g(ωg(α1#α2#α3)) = ω(h−g)−(h′−g′)(α).
Thus, it has been proved that the inequality holds. Now let S
be the sequent B,C,Θ → E and S′ the sequent Θ → B. Then the
height diﬀerences h and h′ are 0 and we get λ1 6 ωh−h′(λ3) = λ3.
Regardless of the last cut has been eliminated, we thus have λ1 6
λ3. Correspondingly we get λ2 6 λ3. Using the inequality λ3 <
ωl−m2(κ) and the fact that m1 = m2 we then get λ1#λ2#λ3 <
ωl−m1(κ), since l > m1. Furthermore, we get that λ0 = ωm1−k(λ1#
(ωm2−m1(λ2#λ3))) = ωm1−k(λ1#λ2#λ3) < ωm1−k(ωl−m1(κ))
= ωl−k(κ) = λ.
From the inequality λ0 < λ we get, according to lemma 4.4.4,
that o(P ) > o(P ′).
Case 2. Assume that the cut formula of the last suitable cut is
∀xB(x). The derivation P then has the form
....
Γ′1 → B(y/x)
Γ′1 → ∀xB(x)
R∀
....
Γ1 → ∀xB(x)
....
B(t/x),Γ′2 → D′
∀xB(x),Γ′2 → D′
L∀
....
∀xB(x),Γ2 → D
Γ1−2 → D I....
Θ→ E....→
where the sequent Θ→ E is deﬁned in the same way as in case 1.
From the derivation of the sequent B(t/x),Γ′2 → D′2 we get a
derivation of the sequent ∀xB(x), B(t/x),Γ′2 → D′2 by adding a for-
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mula in the context. Let P2 be the following derivation:
....
Γ1 → ∀xB(x)
....
∀xB(x), B(t/x),Γ′2 → D′....
∀xB(x), B(t/x),Γ2 → D
B(t/x),Γ1−2 → D
J2
....
B(t/x),Θ→ E
We can get a derivation of the sequent Γ′1 → B(t/x) from the
derivation of Γ′1 → B(y/x) by substituting y with t. We then ap-
ply the rules between the logical rule and J2 in P2 to the sequent
Γ′1 → B(t/x) (this is possible because the quantiﬁed formula in the
succedent of the sequents in P2 is not principal in any rule above the
cut J2). We now have a derivation of the sequent Γ1 → B(t/x) and
can instead of applying the cut add the missing context in the an-
tecedent and get a derivation of Γ1−2 → B(t/x). Then we apply the
cuts and contractions below the cut J2 on formulas in the antecedent.
If we have a cut on the succedent, that is on the formula that has
been replaced with B(t/x), we just add the missing context in the
antecedent and eliminate the cut. Thus, we obtain a valid derivation
of the sequent Θ→ B(t/x) and we call this derivation P1.
Now we can join the two derivations together into one derivation
P ′
P1....
Θ→ B(t/x)
P2....
B(t/x),Θ→ E
Θ2 → E Cut.... contractions
Θ→ E....→
The ordinal calculations are similar to the ones in case 1 and for the
other cases of cut formulas the proofs are also similar.
Thus, we have reduced the derivation P into a derivation P ′ with
a lower ordinal and the proof of lemma 4.4.21 is ﬁnished. We can
conclude that the derivation P ′ also fulﬁlls the requirement that all
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arithmetical rules are applied before the logical and structural rules.
This makes it possible to repeat the reduction and get a sequence of
decreasing ordinals.
With the proof of the reduction procedure ﬁnished we also have
a proof of the consistency theorem 4.4.2.
Some of the essential features of our proof are: Cut elimination is
proved directly, without Gentzen's rule of multicut; The arithmetical
axioms are treated purely syntactically; all rules with several premises
have independent contexts and no rule of weakening is used. It is
hoped that a comparison of our proof with Gentzen's notes in his
series BTJZ will be helpful in the understanding of Gentzen's work
on the consistency of intuitionistic arithmetic. There are still only
fragmentary translations of these notes, but the problem seems to
have been contraction and thereby the multiplication of certain parts
of the derivations in the reductions.
Finally, because of the close connection between an intuitionistic
sequent calculus with independent contexts and natural deduction,
proof presented in this chapter is a useful step towards the proof in
natural deduction. However, it will be shown in chapter 5 that the
ordinal assignment of the natural deduction system requires special
treatment. The ordinal assignment diﬀers completely, due to the
fact that the cut rule places sequents beside each other, whereas the
composition of derivations in natural deduction stores subderivations
on top of each other.
Chapter 5
Consistency of Heyting
arithmetic in natural
deduction
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article:
A. Kanckos, Consistency of Heyting Arithmetic in Natural
Deduction. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, vol. 56 (2010),
no. 6, pp. 611 624.
The earliest proofs of the consistency of Peano arithmetic were
presented by Gentzen. Since the publication of Gentzen's proof in
sequent calculus, the conducting of the consistency proof in standard
natural deduction has been an open problem. The aim of this chap-
ter is to solve this problem by giving a consistency proof in natural
deduction for Heyting arithmetic. The result is based on a normal-
ization proof by Howard [11].
The present consistency proof is performed in the manner of
Gentzen, by giving a reduction procedure for derivations of falsity.
The procedure is appended with the assignment of a vector to each
derivation and it is shown that the reduction reduces the ﬁrst compo-
nent. This component can be interpreted as an ordinal less than 0,
thus ordering the derivations by complexity and proving termination
of the process. To prove consistency it needs to be established that
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no derivation of the simplest kind exists. An important initial task
is then to examine how natural deduction can be extended into an
arithmetical system.
5.1 Logical calculus
The following rules constitute the standard calculus of intuitionistic
natural deduction. Negation is a deﬁned concept with ¬A ≡ A ⊃ ⊥.
⊥
C
⊥E
A B
A&B
&I
A&B
A
&E
A&B
B
&E
A
A ∨B ∨I
B
A ∨B ∨I
A ∨B
[A]
....
C
[B]
....
C
C
∨E
[A]
....
B
A ⊃ B ⊃I
A ⊃ B A
B
⊃E
A(y/x)
∀xA ∀I
∀xA
A(t/x)
∀E
A(t/x)
∃xA(x) ∃I
∃xA(x)
[A(y/x)]
....
C
C
∃E
In the formula denoted by A(t/x) every occurrence of the variable
x in A(x) has been substituted with the term t. The standard variable
restriction holds in the rules ∀I and ∃E: the eigenvariable y must not
be free in the conclusion of the rule, nor in any assumption that the
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conclusion depends on, except for the discarded assumption A(y/x)
in the existential rule. The premise with logical structure, which
is eliminated in the conclusion of an elimination rule, is the major
premise of the rule. The other premises are minor premises.
5.2 Arithmetical rules and induction
As mentioned in the paper by Negri and von Plato [21], it is possible
to convert the rules of sequent calculus into non-logical introduction
and elimination rules of natural deduction.
Rules for the equality relation:
t = t
Ref
t = t′
t′ = t
Sym
t = t′ t′ = t′′
t = t′′
Tr
Recursion rules:
t+ 0 = t
+Rec0
t+ s(t′) = s(t+ t′)
+Recs
t · 0 = 0 ·Rec0 t · s(t′) = t · t′ + t ·Recs
Replacement rules:
t = t′
s(t) = s(t′)
sRep
t = t′
t+ t′′ = t′ + t′′
+Rep
t′ = t′′
t+ t′ = t+ t′′
+Rep
t = t′
t · t′′ = t′ · t′′ ·Rep
t′ = t′′
t · t′ = t · t′′ ·Rep
Inﬁnity rules:
s(t) = 0
⊥ Inf1
s(t) = s(t′)
t = t′
Inf2
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Induction rule:
A(0/x)
[A(y/x)]
....
A(sy/x)
A(t/x)
Ind
The eigenvariable y of the induction rule obeys the standard variable
restriction and the induction formula A is arbitrary.
Although the system is intuitionistic it is possible to derive the
law of excluded middle for atomic formulas, ∀x∀y(x = y ∨ ¬x = y),
by the induction rule. Therefore, the formula A∨¬A can be derived
for an arbitrary quantiﬁer-free formula A.
5.2.1 Deﬁnition. A purely arithmetical derivation is a derivation
where only arithmetical rules occur. (Induction is not included among
the arithmetical rules.)
5.3 Properties of arithmetical derivations
The overall aim of Gentzen-style consistency proofs is to reduce com-
plex derivations of a contradiction to simpler derivations. Therefore,
a natural starting point is to consider the most elementary kind of
derivations. The primary goal is to prove consistency for these purely
arithmetical derivations.
5.3.1 Lemma. (i) For a closed term t there exists a unique nu-
meral m, for which there is a purely arithmetical derivation of
t = m.
(ii) Let t and t′ be closed terms and assume that there is a purely
arithmetical derivation of the formula t = t′. Then there is a
purely arithmetical derivation of the formula q(t/x) = q(t′/x)
for an arbitrary term q(x).
(iii) Let t and t′ be closed terms and assume that there is a purely
arithmetical derivation of the formula t = t′. Then for arbitrary
terms q(x) and r(x) there is a purely arithmetical derivation of
q(t′/x) = r(t′/x) from the open assumption q(t/x) = r(t/x).
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(iv) Let t and t′ be closed terms and assume that there is a purely
arithmetical derivation of the formula t = t′. Then for an ar-
bitrary formula A the formula A(t/x) ⊃ A(t′/x) can be derived
without Ind.
Proof. The proof of (i)-(iii) is by induction on the complexity of the
term and the proof of (iv) is by induction on the complexity of the
formula A. By proving that there is a derivation of A(t′) from the
open assumption A(t) a proof of (iv) is obtained through a ﬁnal
implication introduction. If A is an atomic formula, then the claim
is proved in (iii). For the inductive step it is assumed that formula
A is a compound formula. Assuming that A is a conjunction B&C,
the following derivation may be constructed:
[B(t)&C(t)]
B(t)
&E
....
B(t′)
[B(t)&C(t)]
C(t)
&E
....
C(t′)
B(t′)&C(t′)
&I
(B(t)&C(t)) ⊃ (B(t′)&C(t′)) ⊃I
The other cases are similar.
5.3.2 Lemma. There is no purely arithmetical derivation of falsity.
Proof. By the uniqueness of the numeral equal to a term, the premise
of rule Inf1 cannot be derived without open assumptions. Therefore,
it is not possible to derive falsity.
5.4 Assignment of vectors to derivations
The normalization proof of Howard [11] provides a unique ordinal as-
signment up to 0 to terms of Gödel's theory T of primitive recursive
functionals and proves that restricted reductions of the terms reduce
the ordinals. In addition, a non-unique assignment is given for gen-
eral reductions. By the well-ordering of 0, each reduction sequence
terminates into a normal form, thereby proving strong normalization.
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The unique assignment can be adapted to derivations in natural
deduction. If each derivation is assigned an ordinal number as a mea-
sure of its complexity, then derivations can be ordered aiming for a
proof of termination. The assignment of ordinal numbers to terms
in T is indirect through a vector assignment and an interpretation
of vectors as ordinals. A detour by vectors is needed, because the
length of the vector provides an additional parameter for the calcu-
lations. This parameter is used in the deﬁnition of two operations
(also originating in Howard's paper) that will provide desired prop-
erties of vectors. The length of the vector assigned to a formula in a
derivation will depend on the complexity of the formula.
5.4.1 Deﬁnition. The level of a formula A, denoted l(A), is induc-
tively deﬁned.
1. The level of an atomic formula and falsity is 0.
2. The level of a conjunction A&B is max{l(A), l(B)}.
3. The level of a disjunction A ∨B is max{l(A), l(B)}.
4. The level of an implication A ⊃ B is max{l(A) + 1, l(B)}.
5. The level of a universally quantiﬁed formula ∀xA is l(A).
6. The level of an existentially quantiﬁed formula ∃xA is l(A).
5.4.1 The theory E
The vectors that will be assigned to derivations and formulas of
derivations are vectors of expressions. These expressions are de-
ﬁned by introducing an axiomatic theory E of an order relation ≺
on expressions. In section 5.4.3 the expressions of this theory will be
interpreted as ordinals.
5.4.2 Deﬁnition. Expressions are inductively deﬁned.
(i) The constants 0, 1 and ω are expressions.
(ii) For all formulas A and all i in N, the variable xAi is an expres-
sion.
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(iii) If f and g are expressions, then f +g and (f, g) are also expres-
sions.
Equality between expressions is treated axiomatically and obeys
reﬂexivity and the replacement axiom. The weak order relation f 4 g
is deﬁned as f ≺ g or f = g and the relation f  g as g ≺ f . The
axioms of the theory E are listed below.
1. If f ≺ g and g ≺ h, then f ≺ h.
2. If f ≺ g, then ¬f = g.
3. f + g = g + f and (f + g) + h = f + (g + h).
4. If f ≺ g, then f + h ≺ g + h.
5. f + g = f if and only if g = 0.
6. 0 4 f and 0 ≺ 1 ≺ ω.
7. If f ≺ ω and g ≺ ω, then f + g ≺ ω.
8. (f, g + h) = (f, g) + (f, h).
9. If g ≺ c and h ≺ c, then (g, f) + (h, f) 4 (c, f).
10. If f ≺ g, then (h, f) ≺ (h, g).
11. If f ≺ g and ¬h = 0, then (f, h) ≺ (g, h).
12. (0, f) = f .
13. (f, (g, h)) = (f + g, h)
If f  0 and h  0, then by axioms 12, 11 and 8 the following
inequality holds:
(f, g) + h ≺ (f, g + h) if f  0 and h  0. (5.4.3)
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5.4.2 Vectors of expressions
Expressions can be divided into classes, Ci, with the property that
each expression in a class contains no variable that has a lower index
than the class. A class of vectors C can be deﬁned by presupposing
that each component of the vector belongs to the corresponding class
of expressions. The vectors in C will be the ones assigned to formulas
in a derivation and two operations, the box- and the delta-operation
acting upon these vectors will shortly be deﬁned.
If fi is an expression for each 0 6 i 6 n, then the n+ 1-tuple f =
〈f0, . . . , fn〉 is a vector of length n. For 0 6 i 6 n the expression fi,
also denoted (f)i, is called the ith component of f . For i > length(f),
the component (f)i is deﬁned to be 0. Addition of vectors f and g is
done component by component, f + g = 〈f0 + g0, . . . , fn + gn〉 where
n = max{length(f), length(g)}.
Finally, a vector of variables is deﬁned for every formula A with
the level l(A) = n, xA = 〈xA0 , . . . , xAn 〉.
5.4.4 Deﬁnition. The classes Ci of expressions are deﬁned by four
clauses.
(i) If the expression h contains no variables, then h is in Ci.
(ii) For every formula A, the variable xAi is in Ci.
(iii) If the expressions f and g are in Ci, then so is f + g.
(iv) If the expression f is in Ci+1 and the expression g is in Ci, then
(f, g) is in Ci.
The class C consists of all vectors h, such that hi is in Ci for 0 6 i 6
length(h).
5.4.5 Deﬁnition. The box-operation of two vectors fg is deﬁned to
be the vector h = 〈h0, . . . , hn〉, where n = max{length(f), length(g)},
such that
hn = fn + gn and
hi = (hi+1, fi + gi) for 0 6 i < n. (5.4.6)
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Note that equation 5.4.6 in fact holds for all 0 6 i 6 n, because
recalling that hi = 0 for all i > max{length(f), length(g)}, and
relying on axiom 12 the component hn can be written as a pair and a
simple calculation gives hi = fn+gn = (0, fn+gn) = (hn+1, fn+gn).
Another noticeable fact is the commutativity of the box-operation
that follows from axiom 3, which states commutativity of addition
on the expressions.
5.4.7 Deﬁnition. The delta-operation on a formula A of an expres-
sion h in ∪Ci, denoted δAh, is a vector in C of length l(A) + 1 that
does not contain any component of the vector xA. The vector is
deﬁned when the Ci, to which h belongs, is speciﬁed.
1. If h is in Ci and contains no component of x
A, then δAh is
the vector of length l(A) + 1, deﬁned by (δAh)i = h + 1 and
(δAh)j = 1, when j 6= i and 0 6 j 6 l(A) + 1.
2. If h is xAi , then (δ
Ah)j = 1 for 0 6 j 6 l(A) + 1.
3. If h contains a component of xA and h = f + g, where f and g
are in Ci, then δ
Ah = δAf + δAg.
4. If h contains a component of xA and h = (f, g), where f is in
Ci+1 and g is in Ci, then
(δAh)j = (δ
Af)j + (δ
Ag)j if 0 6 j 6 l(A) and
(δAh)j = 2(δ
Af)j + 2(δ
Ag)j + 1 if j = l(A) + 1.
The delta-operation is also deﬁned for vectors h = 〈h0, . . . , hn〉 in C.
(δAh)j = (δ
Ah0)j + · · ·+ (δAhn)j if 0 6 j 6 l(A) + 1
and if n > l(A) + 1, then we deﬁne
(δAh)j = hj + 1 for l(A) + 1 < j 6 n.
The vector δAh has the length max{l(A) + 1, n}.
By the deﬁnitions of the operations both are well-deﬁned opera-
tions on vectors in C.
5.4.8 Lemma. If f and g are in C, then fg and δAf are in C.
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5.4.3 Interpretation of E
To ﬁnalize the argument of the consistency proof, expressions of the
theory E are to be interpreted as ordinals. In general, expressions can
be interpreted as functions of the variables contained in them. From
the ﬁrst component of the vector assigned to a derivation a function
is obtained, which applied to a suitable constant, say 0, will give an
ordinal.
The relation a  b is interpreted as a > b and a+ b as the natural
sum a#b. The natural sum of two ordinals a and b represented in
Cantor normal form a = ωa1+· · ·+ωan and b = ωb1+· · ·+ωbm , where
a1 > · · · > an and b1 > · · · > bm, is deﬁned as a#b = ωc1 + · · · +
ωcn+m , where c1 > · · · > cn+m is a rearrangement of the sequence
a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm. The deﬁnition of (a, b) is separated into two
cases depending on whether b = 0. The pair (a, 0) is interpreted as
0. On the other hand, assume that b  0 and represent b in Cantor
normal form to the base 2, b = 2b1 + · · ·+ 2bn , where b1 > · · · > bn.
Then (a, b) is 2c1 + · · · + 2cn , where ci = a#bi and 1 6 i 6 n. The
described interpretation satisﬁes axioms 1 to 13 of the theory E given
in section 5.4.1.
5.4.4 The vector assignment
After all preparations it is now possible to assign a vector, f , to each
formula, A, in a derivation such that length(f) = l(A) and f is in
C. To increase readability the following notation is introduced: if
f = 〈f0, . . . , fn〉, and g = 〈f0, . . . , fm〉 where m 6 n, then g = (f) m
is the restricted vector.
5.4.9 Deﬁnition. The vector assigned to a formula in a derivation
is inductively deﬁned as follows:
1. An assumption A is assigned the vector xA = 〈xA0 , . . . , xAn 〉,
where n = l(A).
2. The conclusion of an arithmetical rule without premises is as-
signed the vector 〈0〉.
3. The conclusion of a one-premise arithmetical rule has the same
vector as the premise.
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4. If the premises of an instance of Tr or &I are assigned the
vectors f and g, then the conclusion of the rule is assigned the
vector f + g.
5. If the premise of an instance of &E is assigned the vector f ,
then the conclusion of the rule is assigned a vector g, such that
gi = fi + 1, for 0 6 i 6 n, where n is the level of the formula in
the conclusion.
6. If the premise of ∨I is assigned the vector f , then the conclusion
of the rule is assigned the vector g, such that gi = fi + 1, for
0 6 i 6 n, where n is the level of the formula in the conclusion.
7. If the premises of ∨E are assigned the vectors f , g and h, then
the conclusion of the rule is assigned the vector e, such that
ei = (f(δAg + δBh))i for 0 6 i 6 n, where n is the level of
the formula in the conclusion and A and B are the discarded
assumptions of the rule.
8. If the premise of ⊃ I is assigned the vector f , then the con-
clusion of the rule is assigned the vector δAf , where A is the
discarded assumption of the rule.
9. If the premises of ⊃ E are assigned the vectors f and g, then
the conclusion of the rule is assigned the vector h, such that
hi = (fg)i for 0 6 i 6 n, where n is the level of the formula
in the conclusion.
10. If the premise of ∀I is assigned the vector f , then the conclusion
of the rule has the same vector.
11. If the premise of ∀E is assigned the vector f , then the conclusion
of the rule is assigned the vector g, such that gi = fi + 1, for
0 6 i 6 length(f).
12. If the premise of ∃I is assigned the vector f , then the conclusion
of the rule has the same vector.
13. If the premises of ∃E are assigned the vectors f and g, then
the conclusion of the rule is assigned the vector h, such that
hi = (fδA(x)g)i, for 0 6 i 6 n, where n is the level of the
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formula in the conclusion and A(x) is the discarded assumption
of the rule.
14. If the premise of ⊥E is assigned the vector f , then the conclu-
sion of the rule is assigned the vector g, such that gi = fi+1, for
0 6 i 6 n, where n is the level of the formula in the conclusion.
15. If the formula concluded by an instance of Ind is A(t), then
the vector assigned to this formula depends on the term t. Let
f = 〈f0, . . . , fn+1〉, where n = l(A), be the vector assigned to
the derivation of A(m′) ⊃ A(t′) described in lemma 5.3.1(iv)
for some closed term t′ for which t′ = m′ is derivable.
(a) If t is a closed term, then there is a derivation of t = m for
some unique numeral m according to lemma 5.3.1. If the
vectors assigned to the premises of the Ind-rule are h and
g, then the vector of the conclusion of the induction is
((〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2(m+ 1)〉δA(x)g) n+1 h) n,
where the length of the vector 〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2(m + 1)〉 is
n+ 2 = l(A) + 2.
(b) If on the other hand the term t contains a variable, then
the vector of the conclusion of the induction is
((〈f0, . . . , fn+1, ω〉δA(x)g) n+1 h) n,
where the length of 〈f0, . . . , fn+1, ω〉 is n+ 2 = l(A) + 2.
The vector assigned to the conclusion of a derivation is the vector
assigned to the whole derivation.
Note that the delta-operation is always performed on a vector
when an assumption is discharged in the subderivation to which the
vector is assigned. The performed operation gives a vector not con-
taining the variables assigned to the discarded assumption. There-
fore, a formula derived without open assumptions (i.e. a theorem)
must have a vector assigned to it which do not contain any variables.
In particular, the vector f used in the assignment of vectors to
inductions does not contain any variables. Furthermore, since the
5.5. Reduction procedure 97
vector 〈0〉 is assigned to a purely arithmetical derivation without
open assumptions, the vector f does not depend on the term t′, but
only on the logical structure of A and the vector is well-deﬁned.
5.5 Reduction procedure
The restricted reductions of [11] with a unique ordinal assignment
correspond to a limitation in choice of the considered reducibility in
the HA-derivation. The reducibility may not be a part of a sub-
derivation that has open assumptions. Since all open assumptions
must be discharged to derive a theorem, there would be an applica-
tion of the delta-operation on the corresponding vector if there were
open assumptions. The problem that arises with these general re-
ductions is that order preservation is not necessarily provable for the
delta-operation. If f ≺ g, then (δAf)i ≺ (δAg)i does not follow in
any obvious way when the expressions f and g diﬀer in structure and
fall under separate clauses in the deﬁnition of the delta-operation.
However, even if general reductions cannot be treated, a suitable re-
ducibility can be chosen in a derivation of falsity.
5.5.1 Theorem. If there is a derivation of ⊥ to which the vector f
is assigned, then there is a derivation of ⊥ to which the vector g is
assigned and f0  g0.
Proof. Assume that there exists a derivation of ⊥. Reduction steps
are performed on the derivation in a speciﬁc order, each step is per-
formed as many times as possible before proceeding to the next step.
First step 1 is applied as many times as possible, then step 2 if pos-
sible. If step 2 is not possible, then step 3 may apply and ﬁnally if
no other reduction is possible step 4 is performed.
Step 1. All free variables in the derivation, which are not eigen-
variables, are replaced with the constant 0.
Step 2. If there is an instance of falsity elimination in the deriva-
tion below all instances of introduction rules and inductions and be-
low which there are only arithmetical rules and major premises of
elimination rules, then it is possible to eliminate the rule and the
rest of the derivation below the rule. The new derivation is also a
derivation of falsity, with no open assumptions.
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Step 3. Assume that there is at least one induction below which
there are no introduction rules, only major premises of elimination
rules and arithmetical rules. Consider the lowermost (or rather one
of the lowermost) of these inductions.
....
A(0)
[A(x)]
....
A(sx)
A(t)
Ind
Because there are no introduction rules, and in particular no uni-
versal introduction below the induction and only major premises of
elimination rules, in particular no minor premise of existential elimi-
nation, the formula A(t) cannot contain eigenvariables. Furthermore,
all free variables were replaced in step 1. Therefore, the term t must
be closed and there exists a derivation of t = m for some numeral m
according to lemma 5.3.1(i). The reduction now performed depends
on the numeral m.
Case 1. If m ≡ 0, then according to lemma 5.3.1(iv) there is a
derivation of A(0) ⊃ A(t) without inductions. The reduced derivation
is composed by implication elimination with the ﬁrst premise of the
induction as minor premise.
....
A(0) ⊃ A(t)
....
A(0)
A(t)
⊃E
Case 2. If m ≡ s(m′) for some numeral m′, then according
to lemma 5.3.1(iv) there is a derivation of A(sm′) ⊃ A(t) without
inductions and the following reduction on the derivation is performed:
....
A(sm′) ⊃ A(t)
[A(m′)]
....
A(sm′)
A(m′) ⊃ A(sm′) ⊃I
....
A(0)
[A(x)]
....
A(sx)
A(m′)
Ind
A(sm′)
⊃E
A(t)
⊃E
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The derivation of A(sm′) from A(m′) is the second premise of the
original induction with m′ substituted for x.
Step 4. According to lemma 5.3.2 there is no purely arithmeti-
cal derivation of falsity. Therefore, the derivation must contain an
instance of induction, falsity elimination, or another logical rule. Con-
sider a lowermost instance of such a rule. If it is falsity elimination
or induction, then either step 2 or step 3 applies. Now assume that
we have a logical rule in the derivation. Because the conclusion of
the derivation is not compound, there must be an elimination rule
below each introduction. Hence, it may be assumed that the rule is
an elimination rule. If the major premise of the elimination rule is
the conclusion of another elimination rule, then it is possible to trace
up through the major premises of elimination rules, until a formula
concluded by some other rule is reached. The major premise under
consideration is a compound formula and therefore not concluded by
an arithmetical rule, neither can the formula be a discharged assump-
tion because no rule discharges assumptions above major premises of
elimination rules. Three possibilities remain, each suitable for reduc-
tion: the formula is concluded by falsity elimination, induction or an
introduction rule. In the ﬁrst two cases step 2 or step 3 applies. In
the third case an operational reduction is performed depending on
the outermost logical connective of the formula.
Case 1. If the formula is an implication, then the derivation has
the form:
[A]
....
B
A ⊃ B ⊃I
....
A
B
⊃E
and this is reduced into the following derivation:
....
A....
B
Case 2 to case 5 on conjunctions, disjunctions, universally and
existentially quantiﬁed formulas respectively are similar standard de-
tour conversions.
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Thus, in all cases the derivation has been reduced. The vector
calculations associated with the reductions are performed in lemma
5.6.12.
5.6 Vector calculations
Lemmas 5.6.1-5.6.7, stating properties of the box- and delta-operations,
are all proven or simply stated in [11]. The lemmas 5.6.1-5.6.4 are
proven by downward induction on i from the axioms of the theory E .
The expression denoted by f [g/xA] is obtained from the expression f
by substitution of each occurrence of xAi with (g)i. The notation also
applies to vectors f [g/xA], where variable occurrences are replaced
in each component.
5.6.1 Lemma. (fg)i < fi for all i.
5.6.2 Lemma. Assume that length(f) = length(g) = n and fi < gi
for 0 6 i 6 n, then (fh)i < (gh)i for all i.
5.6.3 Lemma. Under the assumption of lemma 5.6.2 and the ad-
ditional assumption fi  gi for 0 6 i 6 k and some k 6 n, the
inequality (fh)i  (gh)i holds for 0 6 i 6 k.
Lemma 5.6.3 can be generalized for vectors that diﬀer in length.
Because if length(f) = n, length(g) = m, n > m and fi  gi for
all i 6 m, then (fh)i  (〈g0, . . . , gm, 0, . . . , 0〉h)i = (gh)i for all
i 6 m.
5.6.4 Lemma. Assume that length(f) = length(g) = n + 1 >
length(h) and fi  0 and gi  0 for 0 6 i 6 n + 1. Let c be a
vector such that 2fn+1 + 2gn+1 ≺ cn+1 and fi + gi 4 ci for all i 6 n.
Then
2((fh)(gh))i ≺ (ch)i for all i 6 n+ 1.
5.6.5 Lemma. Let e be a vector of length l(A) and assume h is in
Ci. Then ((δ
Ah)e)i  h[e/xA].
Proof. The lemma is proven by induction on the number of times
clauses 3 and 4 in the deﬁnition of the delta-operation are applied in
δAh. A complete proof is found in [11, Lemma 2.11].
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5.6.6 Corollary. If h is in C and e has length l(A), then ((δAh)e)i 
(h[e/xA])i for all i 6 length(h).
The next lemma is proven by induction on the length of the deriva-
tion.
5.6.7 Lemma. Assume that there is a derivation of A to which the
vector f is assigned and a derivation of B to which the vector g is
assigned and that A is an open assumption in the latter derivation.
Assume furthermore that no open assumption in the derivation of A
becomes discarded in the derivation of B, where all assumptions A
have been replaced with the derivation of A, then the vector assigned
to this derivation is g[f/xA].
Now the aim becomes to prove that the reduction performed in
step 1, substituting a constant for each free variable, does not increase
the components of the vector.
5.6.8 Lemma. If there is a derivation to which the vector h is as-
signed and another derivation, to which the vector g is assigned, and
the latter derivation is obtained from the former by substituting a
term for a free variable, then hi < gi for 0 6 i 6 length(h).
Proof. The vector assignment is otherwise the same, but for the fact
that some inductions concluding a term with a variable may now
have become inductions with a closed term, which fall under the
ﬁrst clause of the vector assignments to inductions. Assume that
this is the case for some induction. Now, (〈f0, . . . , fn+1, ω〉)i <
(〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2(m + 1)〉)i for all i. By induction on the number
of times the box- and delta-operations are applied, it is possible to
show that the inequalities are preserved for the components of the
vectors. The induction hypothesis is that hi < h′i and gi < g′i for
all i, and the inductive step gives (hg)i < (hg′)i < (h′g′)i by
lemma 5.6.2.
What remains to be shown is that a similar inequality holds for
the delta-operation, (δAh)i < (δA
′
h′)i, where A′ comes from A by
substitution of the term for the free variable.
1. If hj contains no component of x
A, then h′j contains no com-
ponent of xA
′
and (δAhj)j = hj + 1 < h′j + 1 = (δA
′
h′j)j , where
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the inequality follows from the induction hypothesis. The other
components of the vectors δAhj and δ
A′h′j are 1.
2. If hj is x
A
j , then h
′
j is x
A′
j and the components of the vectors
δAhj and δ
A′h′j are 1.
3. If hj contains a component of x
A and hj = u + v, then h
′
j
contains a component of xA
′
and h′j = u
′ + v′. Then δAhj =
δAu+ δAv < δA′u′ + δAv < δA′u′ + δA′v′ = δA′h′j .
4. If hj contains a component of x
A and hj = (u, v), then h
′
j
contains a component of xA
′
and h′j = (u
′, v′). The calculations
of the inequalities are similar to those in case 3.
Thus, in all cases (δAhj)i < (δA
′
h′j)i and therefore (δ
Ah)i < (δA
′
h′)i.
The following lemma calculates the vectors of the reduction per-
formed in step 3 (case 2) dealing with the inductions.
5.6.9 Lemma. Let e = ((〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2m + 4〉g) n+1 h) n,
and let e′ = ((((〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2m + 2〉g) n+1 h) n g) n
f) n, where f = δAf ′, g = δAg′ and furthermore length(f) =
length(g) = n+ 1 and length(h) = n. Then ei  e′i for 0 6 i 6 n.
Proof. First, the vectors r, t and b are deﬁned.
r = (((〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2m+ 2〉g) n+1 h) n g) n
t = ((〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2m+ 2〉g) n+1 h) n
b = (〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2m+ 2〉g) n+1
Let a be the vector of length n+ 1 deﬁned as follows: an+1 = gn+1 +
fn+1 + 1 and ai = (ai+1, gi + fi) for 0 6 i 6 n. Relying on these
deﬁnitions, it is possible to prove that e′i 4 (at)i, by downward
induction on i 6 n. In fact, the stronger claim 2e′i ≺ (at)i is
proven.
For i = n the equation 2e′n = 2(fn+1, rn+fn) = 2(fn+1, (tg)n+
fn) = 2(fn+1, (gn+1, tn + gn) + fn) holds. Furthermore, because f =
δAf ′ for some vector f ′, the strict inequality fj < 1  0 holds for
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all j 6 n + 1 by the deﬁnition of the delta-operation. By a similar
argument: gj < 1  0 for all j 6 n+ 1.
Thus, by inequality 5.4.3, 2(fn+1, (gn+1, tn + gn) + fn) ≺ 2(fn+1,
(gn+1, tn+gn+fn)). By axiom 13 this equals 2(fn+1+gn+1, tn+gn+
fn). Because also the inequality gn + fn = (0, gn + fn) 4 (an+1, gn +
fn) = an holds, 2(fn+1+gn+1, tn+gn+fn) 4 2(fn+1+gn+1, tn+an).
Using axiom 9 and the fact that fn+1 + gn+1 ≺ an+1 the proof of the
base case is completed by the calculation 2(fn+1 + gn+1, tn + an) 4
(an+1, tn + an) = (at)n.
For the inductive step i < n the vector e′ can be analyzed as
follows: 2e′i = 2(e
′
i+1, ri + fi) = 2(e
′
i+1, (ri+1,
ti+gi)+fi). Since i < n, ri+1 = (tg)i+1 < gi+1 < 1 by lemma 5.6.1.
Therefore, it is possible to use inequality 5.4.3 followed by axiom 13
to get 2(e′i+1, (ri+1, ti + gi) + fi) ≺ 2(e′i+1, (ri+1, ti + gi + fi)) =
2(e′i+1 + ri+1, ti + gi + fi). By lemma 5.6.1 ri+1 4 (rf)i+1 = e′i+1,
which gives ri+1 + e
′
i+1 4 2e′i+1. By axiom 9 and the induction
hypothesis the inductive step is completed 2(e′i+1 + ri+1, ti + gi +
fi) 4 ((at)i+1, ti + gi + fi) 4 ((at)i+1, ti + ai) = (at)i. Thus,
e′i 4 (at)i 4 (a(bh))i for i 6 n+ 1.
By lemma 5.6.1 ai 4 (ah)i for i 6 n + 1 and hence e′i 4
((ah)(bh))i. It is therefore suﬃcient to prove that ((ah)(bh))i
≺ (ch)i for all i 6 n+ 1 where
c = (〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2m+ 4〉g) n+1 .
Clearly, ai  0 for i 6 n + 1 and as stated above gi < 1  0
for i 6 n + 1. Therefore, by lemma 5.6.1, bi = (〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2m +
2〉g)i < gi < 1 for i 6 n+ 1 and also bi  0 holds. By lemma 5.6.4
it is suﬃcient to prove
2an+1 + 2bn+1 ≺ cn+1, (5.6.10)
ai + bi 4 ci, for i < n+ 1. (5.6.11)
The ﬁrst goal is to prove inequality 5.6.10. From fn+1 < 1 and
gn+1 < 1 follow that 2an+1 = 2(fn+1+gn+1+1) 4 3(fn+1+gn+1). By
axioms 12, 9 and 11, 3(fn+1 +gn+1) = 3(0, fn+1 +gn+1) 4 (2, fn+1 +
gn+1) ≺ (2m + 3, fn+1 + gn+1). On the other hand by axiom 9
2bn+1 = 2(2m + 2, fn+1 + gn+1) 4 (2m + 3, fn+1 + gn+1). Thus,
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2an+1 + 2bn+1 ≺ 2(2m + 3, fn+1 + gn+1) and by axiom 9 2an+1 +
2bn+1 ≺ (2m+ 4, fn+1 + gn+1) = cn+1.
The remaining goal is to prove inequality 5.6.11. Because it was
proved above, that ai+1  0 and bi+1  0, it follows that ai+1+bi+1 
ai+1 and ai+1 + bi+1  bi+1. Therefore, by axiom 9, ai + bi =
(ai+1, fi + gi) + (bi+1, fi + gi) 4 (ai+1 + bi+1, fi + gi). Hence, by
induction hypothesis ai + bi 4 (ci+1, fi + gi) = ci, which proves the
claim.
The proofs above are suﬃcient preparation for calculating the
vectors of the derivations in the reduction procedure.
5.6.12 Lemma. Let P be a derivation of ⊥ to which the vector f
is assigned. If P ′ from P by performing the reduction described in
theorem 5.5.1 and g is the vector assigned to P ′, then f0  g0.
Proof. Step 1. According to lemma 5.6.8 the expressions of the
vector are not increased, by the procedure of substituting a constant
for free variables in the derivation.
Step 2. The level of falsity is 0, so the vector assigned to the
premise of the falsity elimination has one component, f = 〈f0〉. By
induction on the number of rules below the falsity elimination it can
be shown that the ﬁrst component of the vector assigned to the deriva-
tion P is greater than f0. For the base case of the induction it can
be concluded that the rule of falsity elimination increases the vector,
because f0 + 1  f0. Now assume as the induction hypothesis that
g0  f0 for some vector g assigned to a formula below the falsity
elimination. Below the falsity elimination rule there are no rules that
discharge assumptions that falsity depends on, so there are no delta-
operations on the vector g, but only box-operations and additions
of 1. For the case of the box-operation a simple calculation gives
(gh)0 < g0  f0 by lemma 5.6.1 and the induction hypothesis. If
the elimination rule only adds 1 to the components of the vector,
then the statement is clear. This proves the claim.
Step 3. In this step, where an induction is reduced, there are
two cases.
Case 1. The ﬁrst case considered is when the term in the conclu-
sion of the induction is equal to 0. Let h and g′ be the vectors assigned
to the premises of the induction in P and let f be the vector assigned
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to the derivation of A(m) ⊃ A(t). Furthermore, let g = δA(x)g′ and
denote e = (〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2〉g) n+1. Then the vector assigned to
the conclusion of the induction rule in P is (eh) n. The vector
assigned to the reduced derivation is (fh) n.
By downward induction on i, it can be proved that ei  fi. For
i = n+1 the component of e is en+1 = (2, gn+1+fn+1). Since f = δ
Af ′
for some vector f ′, the components of the vector are positive fi < 1 
0 for 0 6 i 6 n+1. Thus, with axiom 11 of the theory E , the following
calculation holds en+1  (0, gn+1 + fn+1) = gn+1 + fn+1 < fn+1.
For the inductive step the component of e is ei = (ei+1, gi+fi). By
the induction hypothesis ei+1  fi+1  0. Again by axiom 11 and the
fact that fi  0 it can be concluded that ei  (0, gi+fi) = gi+fi < fi.
This concludes the inductive proof.
By lemma 5.6.3 and the claim proved above (eh)i  (fh)i for
0 6 i 6 n + 1 and the vectors of the reduced part of the derivation
have been calculated.
What remains to be shown is that the rules below the reduced
part of the derivation preserve the inequality. This claim is proved
by induction on the number of rules. As in step 2, it can be con-
cluded that there are no rules below discharging assumptions that
the conclusion of the induction rule depends on, so there are only
box-operations and additions of 1. The base case, that the inequal-
ity holds if there are no rules below, is already proved above. Now
assume as the induction hypothesis, that a0  b0 and ai < bi for
i 6 length(a) = length(b). Then lemma 5.6.3 can be used to get
(ac)0  (bc)0 for some vector c and (ac)i < (bc)i for i > 0.
On the other hand, also a0 + 1  b0 + 1 follows from the induction
hypothesis as well as ai + 1 < bi + 1 for i > 0. This proves the claim.
Case 2. The second case of step 3, considers an induction, for
which the term in the conclusion equals a successor. Let h, g and
f be as in case 1. Then the vector assigned to the conclusion of the
induction rule in P is ((〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2m + 4〉g) n+1 h) n and
this is reduced to ((((〈f0, . . . , fn+1, 2m + 2〉g) n+1 h) n g) n
f) n in P ′. The claim that the components of the vector in P are
greater than the components of the vector in P ′ for i 6 n is proven
by lemma 5.6.9. As in case 1 the rules below preserve the inequality.
Step 4. This step is divided into cases according to the logical
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rules in the detour conversion.
Case 1. Let the vector assigned to the premise of the implication
introduction rule in P be f and the vector assigned to the minor
premise of the implication elimination rule be g. Then the vector
assigned to the conclusion of the elimination is (δAfg) l(B). This
vector is reduced to the vector f [g/xA] according to lemma 5.6.7.
Corollary 5.6.6 gives the desired result for these two vectors. As in
step 3 (case 1) the rules below preserve the inequality.
Case 2. Let the vectors assigned to the premises of the con-
junction introduction rule in P be f and g. Assume that A is the
conclusion of the elimination rule. Then the vector assigned to the
conclusion of the elimination is (〈f0 + g0 + 1, . . . , fn + gn + 1〉) l(A),
where n = max{length(f), length(g)}. This vector is reduced to the
vector f .
By the axioms of E it is easily concluded that fi + gi + 1  fi
for all i 6 n and as in step 3 (case 1) the rules below preserve the
inequality.
Case 3. Let the vector assigned to the premise of the disjunction
introduction rule in P be f and let g and h be the vectors assigned to
the minor premises of the elimination rule. Assume that the premise
of the introduction rule is A, since the other case is dual. Then the
vector assigned to the conclusion of the elimination is (〈f0+1, . . . , fn+
1〉(δAg + δBh)) l(C), where n = l(A ∨ B) > length(f), and this is
reduced to g[f/xA] according to lemma 5.6.7.
Now, (δAg+ δBh)i < (δAg)i for all i by the axioms of E and thus
(〈f0 + 1, . . . , fn + 1〉(δAg + δBh))i < (〈f0 + 1, . . . , fn + 1〉δAg)i
for all i by lemma 5.6.2. Furthermore, (〈f0 + 1, . . . , fn + 1〉δAg)i <
(〈f0, . . . , fn〉δAg)i = (fδAg)i for all i. According to corollary 5.6.6
the desired result (fδAg)i  (g[f/xA])i holds for all i 6 l(C). As
in step 3 (case 1) the rules below preserve the inequality.
Case 4. Let the vector assigned to the premise of the universal
introduction rule in P be f , then the vector assigned to the conclu-
sion of the elimination rule is 〈f0 + 1, . . . , fn + 1〉. In the derivation
of the premise of the introduction rule, A(y/x), the term t can be
substituted for x. If t contains a variable, then the vector, f ′, of
the derivation that results from the reduction procedure remains un-
changed and equal to f and if t is closed, then by lemma 5.6.8 the
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components of the vector are not increased. Thus, fi+1  fi < f ′i for
all i 6 n. As in step 3 (case 1) the rules below preserve the inequality.
Case 5. Let the vector assigned to the premise of the existen-
tial introduction rule in P be f and let g be the vector assigned to
the minor premise, C, of the elimination rule. Then the vector as-
signed to the conclusion of the elimination is (fδAg) l(C). Let g′
be the vector of the derivation that results from the process of sub-
stituting the term t in the premise of the introduction rule for x in
the derivation of the minor premise of the elimination rule. Then,
(δAg)i < (δAg′)i and the vector assigned to the reduced derivation
is g′[f/xA]. By lemma 5.6.2 follows that (fδAg)i < (fδAg′)i for
all i. From corollary 5.6.6 the desired result (fδAg′)i  (g′[f/xA])i
follows for i 6 l(C). As in step 3 (case 1) the rules below preserve
the inequality.
5.7 The consistency theorem
5.7.1 Theorem (The consistency of Heyting arithmetic). Falsity is
not derivable in the system HA, that is, it is consistent.
Proof. Assume that the system HA is inconsistent and that there is
a derivation of falsity. According to theorem 5.5.1 there is a reduced
derivation with a lower ordinal and another reduced derivation and so
on. This produces an inﬁnite succession of decreasing ordinals all less
than 0, but this is impossible because the well-ordering of 0 implies
that the reduction procedure must terminate. Thus, there cannot
exist a derivation of falsity and the system of Heyting arithmetic is
consistent.
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